Egypt: Freedom and Justice to the Bedouins in Sinai? A Study of the Freedom and Justice Party s Policy Towards the Bedouin Minority in Sinai by Breen, Heidi
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN I V E R S I T Y 	   O F 	   O S L O : 	   F A C U L T Y 	   O F 	   H UMAN I T I E S 	  
Egypt:	  Freedom	  and	  Justice	  	  
to	  the	  Bedouins	  in	  Sinai?	  
	  
A	  Study	  of	  the	  Freedom	  and	  Justice	  Party’s	  Policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Towards	  the	  Bedouin	  Minority	  in	  Sinai	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Autumn	  2013	  
	  

 Egypt: Freedom and Justice 
to the Bedouins in Sinai? 
 
A Study of the Freedom and Justice Party’s Policy 
 Towards the Bedouin Minority in Sinai 
 
Heidi Breen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autumn 2013 
(60sp) 
 
MA Thesis in Middle East and North Africa Studies at the 
Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages 
 
   
U N I V E R S I T Y 	   O F 	   O S L O : 	   F A C U L T Y 	   O F 	   H U M A N I T I E S 	  
08 Fall	  
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Egypt: Freedom and Justice to the Bedouins in Sinai? 
A Study of the Freedom and Justice Party’s Policy  
Towards the Bedouin Minority in Sinai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Heidi Breen 
 
2013 
 
Egypt: Freedom and Justice to the Bedouins in Sinai? 
 
Heidi Breen 
 
http://www.duo.uio.no 
 
Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo 
 v 
Abstract 
Much research has been devoted to analysing the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) 
ideology, and many have speculated on what kind of policy the MB would lead if it 
came to power. In this study I take a look at the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 
which has its roots in the MB, and the party’s approach towards the increasing 
radicalization of Sinai. If the situation in Sinai is left to further escalate, this might 
push Israel to switch from a defensive to a pre-emptive tactic, potentially causing a 
regional conflict, perhaps even a war. The perpetrators of the various violent attacks 
in Sinai are described as being predominantly Bedouins. This study aims to answer 
the question of whether and how the FJP’s planed policy towards the Bedouin 
minority, was new.  
The Mubarak regime discriminated the Bedouins and violated their human 
rights: social, economical, cultural, civil and political. Three research institutes have 
provided the Egyptian government with several policy recommendations on how to 
solve the Sinai issue. The most recurring recommendation is that the Egyptian 
government should recognize and protect the Bedouins human rights. In 
“Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights”, Kymlicka argues 
that some minority groups should, in addition to basic human rights, be given 
polyethnic rights. Moreover, he adds that some groups should get a limited right to 
self-government, in order to prevent secession from their original nation.  
By means of interviewing several members of the FJP and studying the party’s 
program and public statements, I discovered that my sources in the FJP did not 
portray the Bedouins as a minority, and were therefore not planning to give the 
Bedouins any polyethnic rights. On the other hand, my informants underlined the 
importance of protecting basic civil and political rights of all individuals regardless 
of group affiliation, in addition to implementing a comprehensive socio-economic 
plan for the entire Sinai. Regardless of my sources’ view on the Bedouins, the party’s 
practice of dealing with Bedouin representatives and not interfering with various 
Bedouin tribal institutions, could indicate a pragmatic view on their limited self-
government rights. The conclusion of this thesis show that the FJP’s policy plans to a 
large extent follow the most repeated policy recommendations, and thus, the party’s 
policy towards Sinai and the Bedouins represent a rather different approach from that 
of the Mubarak regime. 
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Preface  
When writing this thesis I did not foresee that a military coup d’état was going to 
overthrow Egypt’s first democratically elected president and his government. Some 
might argue this thesis is no longer relevant as the FJP was overthrown and is now 
even banned. Moreover, Mursi served as president for only a year, and the FJP was 
part of the government for eleven months. Did they even have time to implement a 
policy? 
The objective of this thesis was not to show whether or not the FJP’s policy 
was possible to realize, but rather to analyse their political plan for Sinai. My aim is 
to find out whether and how the FJP’s policy plans represented “something new”, 
and to describe the characteristics of their intended policy. The Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) is perhaps the world’s most famous Islamist group and many have speculated 
about how it would act once in power. In this thesis I have taken a “snapshot” of 
Egypt’s history, and looked at a fraction of FJP’s planed policy, namely the Sinai 
issue. This thesis shows not only how the party was planning to approach a violent 
opposition in a strategically important area, but also how the FJP was aiming to deal 
with an important minority, i.e. the Bedouins. These are also questions that the new 
political leadership in Egypt will have to answer, which make this thesis still relevant 
today.  
Former president Mursi was accused of being “a Mubarak with beard,” which 
suggests that Mursi and his party, the FJP, were not different from the dictator they 
helped to oust in the 2011 revolution. However, throughout the FJP’s time in the 
government, the situation in Sinai actually calmed and there were relatively few 
clashes between the military forces and various militants. Following the coup, Sinai 
has rapidly radicalized, and the situation looks more and more like a civil war every 
day. Bedouin leaders say that locals have been angered by the coup because it 
brought an end to Egypt’s blossoming democracy. Other Bedouins say that Mursi 
had no control over Sinai, but underline that “he didn’t insult or arrest anyone. When 
you would pass by the checkpoints, they would respect you. Now we’re back to the 
way it was before.”1 This could indicate that if the FJP was given a chance, it might 
have had a moderating effect at the situation in Sinai. 
                                                
1 Abigail Hauslohner, "In Egypt’s Sinai, insurgency taking root," The Washington Post, July 29, 2013, 
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1 The Problematic Sinai Issue  
On August 5, 2012 close to a dozen unidentified armed men tried to enter Israel from 
Sinai, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers on the Egyptian side of the border. The 
perpetrators were described as “mostly local Bedouins.”2 For almost thirty years, 
Sinai has been regarded as a buffer zone between mainland Egypt and its eastern 
neighbours. However, as various scholars have noticed, the buffer erodes and Sinai is 
becoming a new front for Islamist extremism, targeting both Egyptians and Israelis.3 
Following the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
announced their intention of founding a political party entitled the Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP). The party won a decisive plurality in both houses of parliament 
during the winter 2011 – 2012 elections. However, two days before the presidential 
election in June 2012, the parliament was dissolved after the court found the voting 
system unconstitutional. Following that, the FJP’s previous chairman, Muhammad 
Mursi, won Egypt’s first democratic presidential election. Three days prior to the 
cross boarder attack, the first Cabinet under Mursi was sworn in. The new Cabinet 
consisted of five FJP members in addition to the president, which made the FJP the 
most powerful political party in Egypt at that time. Just before Mursi was elected 
president, he vowed to allocate 20 billion pound to the development of Sinai stating: 
“We will not forget Sinai anymore.”4 
The radicalization of Sinai has consequences not just domestically, testing the 
strength of its new political reality, but also for neighbouring countries. If the 
situation is allowed to further escalate, this might push Israel to switch from a 
defensive to a pre-emptive posture. Any Israeli military forces in Sinai is a clear 
violation of the peace treaty with Egypt and would cause a regional conflict, perhaps 
even war. This thesis aims to answer whether and how the FJP wanted to approach 
the radicalization of Sinai and consequently the Bedouins who are accused of being 
the perpetrators of several attacks. How was the FJP planning to approach this 
indigenous minority?  
                                                
2 Yaakov Katz, "Israel considers more Egyptian troops in Sinai," The Jerusalem Post, August 7, 2012, 
www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Israel-considers-more-Egyptian-troops-in-Sinai (accessed June 4, 2013). 
3 Referring to the report of Nicolas Pelham, "Sinai: The Buffer Erodes," (London: Chatham House, 
2012); and Ehud Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front," Policy Notes no.9 (2012). 
4 "Dr. Morsi: 20 Billion Pounds for the Reconstruction of Sinai over 5 Years," Freedom and Justice 
Party, April 29, 2012, www.fjparty.org/article.php?id=659&ref=search.php (accessed February 8, 
2013). 
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1.2 Previous Research 
Sinai has become increasingly radicalized for at least a decade, however, prior to 
2011, there are few comprehensive studies on the radicalization of Sinai. Egyptian 
and Israeli interest in Sinai has almost exclusively been of a geostrategic and military 
nature. Characteristically the best maps of Sinai are not publically available.5 After 
2011, the radicalization of Sinai has become a popular topic among scholars, but 
perhaps particularly in the media.6  
I have chosen to present two reports and one scholarly article on the 
increasingly radicalization of Sinai. The two reports are grounded on interviews with 
Sinai Bedouins, and the article makes use of statements by Bedouins published on 
social media. Renowned research institutions have published the three texts, each 
representing a different focus on the situation and emphasizing different aspects, 
seeking to explain the reason(s) for the radicalization. I will argue that combined, 
they present a comprehensive representation of the current situation. Furthermore, I 
have chosen these three texts as they all provide several policy recommendations to 
the Egyptian government on how to best deal with the situation. 
In 2007, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report entitled “Egypt’s 
Sinai Question”.7 This report came as a response to the three bombings in Taba 
(2004), in Sharm al-Shaykh (2005) and in Dahab (2006), which in total resulted in 
the death of around 130 people. A group consisting of Bedouins and Egyptian-born 
Palestinians -all Sinai inhabitants- was later convicted of being responsible for all 
three incidents.8  
The report argues that Sinai traditionally has been a difficult area to integrate 
into Egypt, in particular due to a policy of unequal development in the area that has 
favoured migrants from the Nile Valley on behalf of the local population. The ICG 
addressed the Egyptian government on this topic and proposed that they prepare a 
comprehensive social and economic development plan for Sinai, in consultation with 
community leaders, the private sector and donors. The plan should deal with the 
                                                
5 "Egypt`s Sinai Question,"  (Cairo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007), p.9. 
6 A quick Internet search on news articles regarding Sinai in the years between 2000 and 2010 
provides 131 results, while in the period from 2011 to 2013 gives 37, 800 hits. 
7 The ICG is generally recognised as the world’s leading independent source of analysis and advice to 
governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations and European Union, on the 
prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. For more information see: http://www.crisisgroup.org/  
8 This report is the most comprehensive and detailed public report that exists on these bombings and 
the investigation that followed. 
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region as a whole and take into account the socio-economic interdependence of the 
north and south, and should also eliminate all criteria and procedures that 
discriminate against the local population.9 An important part of the discrimination is 
the dispossession of traditional Bedouin inhabited land and the denial of ownership 
rights in parts of Sinai. During the last fifteen years, the government sale of coastal 
land to major investment groups has pushed local people out of the tourism 
development zones and closed access to the main source of income in the region.10  
The ICG report also stresses the need to integrate the local communities and 
“their genuine political representatives in development decision-making for Sinai”.11 
The report also addresses Egyptian political parties and recommends that they should 
establish, or, where already present, develop and extend a political presence in Sinai. 
The parties should recruit members from the local populations and provide organized 
channels for expression of their particular needs and grievances.12 
 The report also underlines the importance of acknowledging Sinai’s distinct 
cultural and historical traditions as part of Egypt’s national heritage and fund projects 
that preserve them, stating that the Egyptian government had a centralist, 
authoritarian vision that generally ignored the special characteristics of its 
provinces.13 
Following the investigation of the Taba attack, over three thousand persons 
were arrested, and according to Human Rights Watch, several detainees were 
tortured during the investigations.14 To prevent future attacks in Sinai, the report 
argues that in addition to the presence of a strong military, good intelligence is of 
great importance, which in turn depends on a fundamentally cooperative attitude of 
the majority of the local population. The ICG report recommends that in order to 
transform local attitudes and make the local population perceive the Egyptian rule as 
legitimate, the government should redefine the political, economic, social and 
cultural choices made for the region, and adopt a new policy aimed at fully 
integrating the region’s population, on terms it can accept, into the Egyptian national 
community. 
                                                
9 "Egypt`s Sinai Question,"  p.ii. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p.ii. 
13 Ibid., p.19. 
14 "Egypt: Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai," Human Rights Watch 17, no. 3 (2005). 
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In January 2012, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy published an 
article written by Ehud Yaari15 called “Sinai: A New Front”. The article argues that 
the Sinai Peninsula has emerged as a new hotspot in the complex Arab-Israeli 
conflict. With an expanding terrorist infrastructure, the area is becoming another 
front of potential confrontation with Israel.16  
Firstly, the article recommends that Egypt should deploy Egyptian military 
forces along the border, without touching the Camp David Accords. It argues that the 
use of the decade-old “Agreed Activities Mechanism”, concluded privately between 
Israel and Egypt under the auspices of the Multinational Force and Observers 
(MFO),17 enables the parties to effectively bypass the peace treaty’s prohibition 
against stationing Egyptian army close to the Israeli boarder. This kind of agreement 
would have to be concluded individually and for specific periods of time, with the 
option of renewal.18  
Secondly, Yaari recommends an increased Egyptian-Israeli coordination, 
arguing that this will also help the Egyptian military gain a better control over the 
tunnel smuggling and establish tighter supervision on the type of trade conducted.  19  
Thirdly, he proposes that Egypt should use the U.S. aid they receive in two domains: 
Curbing arms smuggling and revising plans for economic development. Regarding 
the second domain, the United States (particularly the U.S. Agency for International 
Development) could support programs aimed at  
 
those Bedouin tribes that are not yet incorporated in the smuggling business nor in the new 
terrorism networks, to improve mobile clinics and better employment and educational 
opportunities. Demonstrating that the state cares for the Bedouins needs could go a long way 
toward convincing them to avoid the risks entailed in smuggling or terrorism.20 
 
The article suggests that increased military and security presence and a better 
cooperation with Israel in this regard, in combination with economic development 
that includes the Bedouins, could turn the situation around.  
                                                
15 Ehud Yaari is an Israel-based International Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
He is also the author of eight books on the Arab-Israeli conflict, including “A Guide to Egypt” (1982). 
For more information about the Washington Institute, see: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/  
16 Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front." 
17 "The Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)," Multinational Force & Observers, 2009-2012, 
http://mfo.org/contingent (accessed January 21, 2013). 
18 Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front." 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p.19. 
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In September 2012, Nicolas Pelham21 wrote a report published by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.22 The report was entitled “Sinai: 
The Buffer Erodes”. The report examines the attempts by the governments of Egypt, 
Israel and Gaza to protect what they view as their vital security and commercial 
interests.  
Pelham presents three main proposals that he addresses to the Egyptian 
government in order to guard against further erosion of regional security. Firstly, the 
Bedouins should be integrated into the formal structures of Egyptian rule in Sinai, 
particularly the security forces. Bedouins have traditionally been barred from the 
military and most security services. Consequently, the Bedouins have lost access the 
state benefits and job opportunities that accrue from military service. The MFO, one 
of the province’s largest employers, is by various activists accused of avoiding hiring 
Bedouins for managerial positions. According to Pelham, recruitment has been in the 
hands of Care Services Company, which enjoys close ties with Egypt’s security 
forces. Furthermore, Egyptian positions of governor were typically awarded to 
retired army and police officers during the Mubarak reign. As a consequence, the 
south and north-Sinai governors have not been Bedouins. Furthermore, Egypt’s 
authorities have also prevented Sinai’s tribes from electing their own mukhtars, or 
chiefs, and centrally appointed them instead. To fracture large tribal structures into 
small social units, they have also appointed tribal chiefs in hundreds of Bedouin 
villages.23 
Secondly, according to Pelham, a formalization of trade across Israel, Gaza and 
Egypt will improve the economic development in Sinai and move illegal activities 
into the open, making it easier for the government to control them, whilst also 
providing the inhabitants (especially in the north) with proper jobs and prospects of a 
viable future. Pelham argues that security for Egypt, Israel and Gaza, can better be 
achieved by monitoring access and movement of people and goods across the border 
above ground rather than below it, stating that stability in Sinai and Gaza is 
intimately linked. Furthermore, the Bedouins’ ties to Gaza are not merely economic, 
                                                
21 Pelham has previously worked as a senior analyst for ICG, and as a consultant for the UN on 
Gaza’s political economy. 
22 The institute is a world-leading source of independent analysis about significant developments in 
international affairs. The report is produced in cooperation with TIDA, a centre of studies in Gaza 
founded by Dr. Eyad Serraj, where Nicolas Pelham is a research director. Read more about Chatham 
House here: http://www.chathamhouse.org/  
23 Pelham, "Sinai: The Buffer Erodes," p.3. 
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but also cultural and ideological. To enhance the cooperation between Egypt and 
Gaza will improve the government’s legitimacy among many of the Sinai dwellers, 
especially the Bedouins.24 
Thirdly, he argues that a better coordination between Israel, Gaza and Egypt is 
important in order to establish security in the security vacuum that exists in Sinai 
today. Pelham states that all three governments are engaged in addressing the salafi 
threat and they should therefore work to enhance the security coordination between 
the governments.25 
What is common for all three texts is that they all presented the Egyptian 
government with certain recommendations of how to halt, and permanently solve, 
the radicalization of Sinai, grounded in their understanding of the situation. As there 
is no published research on this particular subject, I will in this thesis investigate how 
the FJP, as a part of Egypt’s first democratically elected government, perceive and 
comprehend the situation and to what degree the FJP was planning to follow these 
recommendations. As all of the abovementioned texts recommend an improved 
relationship between the government and the Bedouins, I will especially focus on 
how the FJP’s policy would affect the indigenous population of Sinai.  
1.3 Research Question 
This thesis aims to answer whether the FJP represented a shift in policy regarding the 
Bedouin minority in Sinai, or if the policy would be a continuation of Mubarak’s 
approach to this question. My research question is thus the following: Did the FJP 
represent a new policy towards the Bedouins in Sinai? 
Sinai is becoming increasingly radicalized. There is a widespread notion 
among scholars, as well as in the media, that the perpetrators of most attacks 
occurring in the peninsula during the last decade are predominantly Bedouins. 
Although several explanations exist as to why the Bedouins are radicalizing, many 
underline the Mubarak regime’s policy towards Sinai and its native inhabitants as an 
important factor.26 Mursi won the presidential election in June 2012, and swore in 
the new Cabinet on August 2 the same year. The FJP had less than a year as part of a 
government before the military coup on July 3, 2013. During the FJP’s time in 
government, what kind of policy towards Sinai did the FJP plan to lead? Was the FJP 
                                                
24 Ibid., p.10. 
25 Ibid., p.32. 
26 See ibid.; "Egypt`s Sinai Question."; Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front." 
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planning to continue the Mubarak policy, or to undertake a new approach towards 
this important area? How would the FJP, during its time as part of a new government 
in a nation state, solve the dilemma of how to deal with a semi-nomadic indigenous 
minority living in such a geo-strategically important area? Did the FJP represent a 
new political approach to this minority and how can we understand this policy? 
1.3.1 A Nation State and Minority Nations 
During the 1800s the idea that each nation had the right to form a state, took form. 
During the 1800s and much of the 1900s, the nation state increasingly became the 
dominant political entity. One definition of a nation is “a large body of people united 
by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or 
territory.”27 The definition of a nation state is “a sovereign state of which most of the 
citizens or subjects are united also by factors, which define a nation (…)”.28 Iceland 
and North Korea are two examples where nearly all citizens share the same language 
and belong to the same ethno-national group, however these are the exceptions. In 
fact no state in the world is culturally and/or ethnically completely homogenous.  
Will Kymlicka, the author of “Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights”, argues that nowadays, all states are either polyethnic states -where 
the state has received additional ethnic groups through immigration –or multination 
states- where nations have been voluntarily or involuntarily incorporated into the 
state, or both. Kymlicka distinguishes between two types of ethno-cultural groups: 
ethnic groups and minority nations. He separates between these two kinds of 
minorities, arguing the two groups raises different issues regarding minority rights. 
Kymlicka notes that immigration is voluntary (he deals separately with the issue of 
refugees) and argues that immigrants generally wish to integrate into the society and 
culture that they enter, while minority nations often desire to retain their culture, and 
often demands some degree of self-government rights.  
Kymlicka describes a minority nation as a distinct and potentially self-
governing society, a group that forms historical community with its own homeland, 
and share a distinct culture and common language. Kymlicka argues that if a 
minority wish to retain its culture, it should be recognized as distinct.29  The 
                                                
27 Nation-state,  in US English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2013). 
28 Nation-stateibid. 
29 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). p.18. 
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Bedouins, the indigenous people of Sinai, have their own customary laws (urf) with 
social and economic practices that have been inherited throughout generations. 
Although the Bedouins speak Arabic, they can be clearly distinguished from the 
Egyptian dialect.30 The Bedouins identify themselves as a distinct group and are very 
aware of their historic origins in the area of Saudi-Arabia. They claim to be ashraf, 
meaning that they descend in a straight lineage from the Prophet Muhammad 
himself.31 Therefore, they do not share, or have any interest in the Pharaonic heritage 
common to the populations (Muslim and Christian) of the Nile Valley.32 After the 
2011 revolution, the Bedouins actually established their own self-rule in the Sinai.33 
As the Bedouins have many characteristics of a minority nation, I will in this thesis 
define them as such. However, the emphasis of the thesis is on investigating how the 
FJP perceive the Bedouins, and what rights they believe the group is entitled to.  
The presence of a minority nation within a nation state often leads to disputes 
over issues like “language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, 
educational curriculum, land claims, immigrations and nationalization policy, and 
even national symbols, […] and public holidays.”34 In an effort to achieve a 
homogeneous polity, various modern nation states have tried different approaches 
towards minorities. Some minorities have been physically extinguished (genocide), 
while others have been coercively assimilated, forced to adopt the country’s 
language, religion and so on. A third approach has been to treat the minority as alien 
residents, subject to physical segregation and economical discrimination and 
deprived of political rights.35 More recently, some nation states have given in to 
demands from minorities, providing them with group-specific rights.36  
In the beginning of the 1900s, minority rights were based mainly on bilateral 
agreements. For example, Germany would agree to provide Polish residents within 
its border with certain rights, as long as Poland did the same for German residents 
within their border. Minorities were thus depending on the presence of a “kind state” 
taking an interest in their rights. After World War II, and the persecution of the Jews, 
it was clear that a new approach to minority rights was needed. Many liberals hoped 
                                                
30 Rudolf De Jong, A Grammar of the Bedouin Dialects of the Northern Sinai Littoral: Bridging the 
Linguistic Gap Between the Eastern and Western Arab World  (Leiden: Brill Academic Pub, 2000). 
31 Ned H. Greenwood, The Sinai, A Physical Geography  (Austin: University of Texas, 1997). p.9. 
32 "Egypt`s Sinai Question,"  p.i. 
33 Nicolas Pelham, "Salvaging Sinai," (Oslo: The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2012). 
34 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights: p.1. 
35 Ibid., p.2. 
36 See further down for more about polyethnic and special representation rights. 
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that respect for human rights, realized by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights 
to all individuals regardless of group membership, would be enough to protect 
minorities.37 
Nonetheless, human rights are unable to resolve some of the most important 
questions concerning minority rights within a nation state, especially regarding 
minority nations. Should the traditional homelands of indigenous peoples be reserved 
for their benefit, and thus be protected from encroachment by settlers and resource 
developers? What are the responsibilities of minorities to integrate? Should 
governmental powers be decentralized from the central level to more local or 
regional levels controlled by particular minorities, particularly on culturally sensitive 
issues?38 The problem is not that human rights give the wrong answers, but that they 
do not give any answers at all. Finding morally defensible answers that supplement 
universal human rights on how to deal with minority rights is one of the greatest 
challenges facing democracies.39 
According to Kymlicka, minority groups can demand two kinds of group-
specific rights: polyethnic rights and/or self-government rights. Firstly, minorities, 
both ethnic groups and minority nations, could demand polyethnic rights (financial 
support and legal protection for certain practices associated with the group’s culture). 
Initially, this was simply the right to freely express one's particularity without fear of 
prejudice or discrimination in the mainstream society. Later on, polyethnic rights 
also intended to actively help minority groups express their cultural particularity 
without hindering their success in the economic and political institutions of the 
majority group’s society. For this reason, anti-racism policies are considered part of 
the “multiculturalism” policy in many countries.40 An example of a typical demand is 
the acknowledgement of the minority culture and linguistic tradition, manifested in 
for example changes to the education curriculum to recognize the history and 
contribution of minorities. Examples of polyethnic rights are public funding of a 
minority’s cultural practices, the founding of ethnic associations, magazines, 
festivals, arts and museums, in addition to the funding for ethnic studies and ethnic 
associations.41  
                                                
37 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights: p.2. 
38 These are just some of the questions poesed by Kymlicka.  
39 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights: p.1. 
40 Ibid., p.31. 
41 Ibid. 
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Secondly, minority nations could demand some degree of self-government 
rights (the delegation of powers to minority nations, often through some form of 
federalism). Normally they demand some form of political autonomy or regional 
jurisdiction, in order to ensure the full and free development of their own cultures 
and the best interests of their people.  
 
Self-government claims, then, typically take the form of devolving political power to a 
political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and 
substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or territory.42  
 
If a minority nation perceives that their self-determination is impossible within the 
larger state, they may wish to secede. After the 2011 revolution, the Bedouins have 
demanded some degree of self-government rights. Bedouin leaders, unknown 
perpetrators of various attacks and demonstrators have demanded an end to 
government appointment of their chiefs (mukhtar), state recognition of urf rulings 
(custom) and tribal participation in the restoration of law and order, and decision-
making and that the government recognize Bedouins’ historical claim to land 
ownership.43 
Virtually all modern states have historically adopted nation-building policies 
seeking the assimilation of the entire population into a common national culture, 
however, few have succeeded in the making of one uniform national culture.44 On 
the other hand: 
 
the nation-building policies adopted by states have been very successful in leading the national 
majority to conceive the whole territory of the state as their nation. As a result, the majority 
now thinks of minorities (or at least their historical territory) in a way that minorities 
themselves reject - that is, as belonging to the dominant nation.45 
 
The majority has a nationalist interest in maintaining the unity of the state to avoid 
losing territory that they perceive as belonging to the dominant majority nation.46 A 
study from the early 1990s showed that the single largest cause of ethnic conflict in 
the world at that time was the struggle by indigenous peoples for the protection of 
                                                
42 Ibid., p.30. 
43 Pelham, "Sinai: The Buffer Erodes," p.3. 
44 Josep Costa, "On theories of secession: Minorities, majorities and the multination state," Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2010): pp:67-68. 
45 Ibid., p.68. 
46 Ibid. 
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their land rights. 47 In Sinai, Bedouins have also demanded compensation for the 
central government’s use of what the Bedouins define tribal land.48  
 According to Kymlicka, a liberal government policy towards ethnical 
minorities should result in the endorsement of self-governing rights for minority 
nations and polyethnic rights for immigrants (other ethnic groups). The first are 
intended to enable a nation to govern itself and maintain its own societal culture, 
while the second offers to help ethnic groups to express their cultural particularity 
while becoming a full and equal member of the majority culture, in other words, 
promote integration.49 
In this thesis I will not give any normative advice to the Egyptian government 
on how to deal with its minorities. Instead, the purpose of this section is to show the 
reader what kind of challenges the government (previous and present) is facing and 
what kind of demands the government can expect from the Bedouins. I will later 
show that the Mubarak regime treated the Bedouins as alien residents, subjects to 
physical segregation and economic discrimination, and in some degree denied 
political rights. More recently, the Bedouins in Sinai have in different manners tried 
to obtain polyethnic rights and demanded some degree of self-government rights. 
However, importantly, they are also demanding basic human rights, for example that 
the government grant citizenship to the more than 100,000 Bedouins who remain 
noncitizens, provide public services, and various other basic services and 
infrastructure.50  
1.3.2 Operationalization  
To answer my research question on whether or not the FJP represented a new policy 
towards the Bedouins in Sinai, the question of how the Mubarak regime dealt with 
the Sinai Bedouins, needs to be addressed. Although most attacks in Sinai are said to 
have been carried out by Bedouins, there exist various interpretations seeking to 
explain why these Bedouins have radicalized. My sources underlined that a main 
factor for the current situation in Sinai was the Mubarak regime’s policy of 
neglecting the peninsula and suppressing its native inhabitants. In order to describe 
the Mubarak regime’s policy in Sinai, I have chosen to present different factors 
                                                
47 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights: p.30. 
48 Pelham, "Sinai: The Buffer Erodes," p.8. 
49 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
50 Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front," p.8. 
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seeking to explain why Sinai, and its inhabitants, are radicalizing. In this way, I will 
show the reader the most common explanations on why the radicalization is 
occurring, and at the same time show how the previous regime dealt with elements 
and factors that might have caused the Bedouins to radicalize.  
To further investigate the character of the FJP’s policy, I will compare their 
policy to recommendations given by the ICG and Chatham House reports and the 
Washington Institute article on how to permanently halt the radicalization of Sinai. 
Embedded in these recommendations was the importance of a radical improvement 
in the relationship between the Bedouins and the central government. The state 
should provide the Bedouins with equal rights to other Egyptians, as well as 
recognize their distinct cultural traditions. As the FJP did not have a single uniform 
policy towards the Bedouins, I will look at their plan to halt and permanently put an 
end to the radicalization of Sinai, because this policy would affect the Bedouins. In 
order to halt the radicalization, the research institutes have combined recommended 
that the government: (1) implement a comprehensive development plan for the entire 
Sinai, (2) increase the military and security presence in the peninsula (it was strongly 
recommended that these forces work in accordance with human rights and the rule of 
law), and (3) and improve their relationship with Sinai’s neighbours Israel and (4) 
similarly for Gaza. In what way the FJP was planning to follow these four 
recommendations will also show how the FJP was planning to approach the Bedouin 
minority. As part of a central government, would the FJP continue to treat the 
minority as alien residents, subject to segregation and discrimination? Was the FJP 
planning to use the universal human rights in guiding their policy, or would it 
provide the Bedouins with group specific rights like self-government rights or 
polyethnic rights or both?  
 Following this comparison, there will be a discussion on why the FJP 
implemented, or failed to implement, a new approach towards this minority. During 
my time in Cairo, I asked all my sources in the FJP why they believe Sinai is 
radicalizing and who they think are responsible, before I asked about their policy in 
the area. Analysing their answers on these questions will make it easier to understand 
and explain the party’s policy. 
 13 
1.4 Methodological Approach 
This thesis is a qualitative study based on material from my fieldwork in Cairo from 
early September to the end of November 2012. Despite wanting to do parts of my 
fieldwork in Sinai, I eventually ended up with not going. This decision was made 
because the Norwegian embassy as well as Egyptian friends advised against 
travelling to Sinai due to the unstable situation. 
My interviews were semi-structured, allowing me to ask some standard 
questions, while also being able to ask more in-depth question when needed. The 
thesis is also grounded in primary literature like the FJP statements in their political 
program, on their own web pages and in the media in general. However, as I could 
not find many statements about their view on Sinai and the Bedouins, interviewing 
them was essential in order to conduct my thesis. 
I chose to use a qualitative approach because this approach is the most suitable 
in answering my research question, as the qualitative method investigates the how 
and why of decision making, not just what, where, when. The actors in the field are 
constructing their own reality, and as a researcher it is hard to understand this reality 
without a flexible methodology. 51  A qualitative research method is a more 
appropriate tool to gain an “in-depth” understanding of human behaviour and the 
reasons that govern such behaviour.52 
After two years of Arabic study at the University of Oslo, and an additional 
one and a half years living in Syria and Egypt, I am competent in Arabic. I conducted 
three of my interviews in Arabic, and the rest in English. During my Arabic 
interviews, situations occurred where I had to ask for rephrasing and clarification due 
to language difficulties. Therefore, on those occasions where it was clear that my 
informant’s English was better than my Arabic, I conducted the interview in English. 
Some of my sources did not speak English at all, or felt they expressed themselves 
better in Arabic, and I believe that my knowledge of the language made them feel 
more comfortable being interviewed. 
Prior to every interview, I told my sources the reason for my interview, and 
that it would be used in a master’s thesis, so as to not cause any misunderstandings. 
All of my sources agreed to let me interview them after I had laid out the details of 
                                                
51 Statsvitenskapelig leksikon, 2 ed. (Universitetsforlaget, 2007). pp.135-6. 
52 Dennis Howitt, Introduction to qualitative methods in psychology  (Essex, England: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2010). 
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my research. I chose to use a digital recorder during the interviews that enabled me 
to actively listen, instead of being too engaged in writing. At the beginning of every 
interview I asked my sources if they wanted to retain their anonymity, however, as 
expected, most were keen on stating their names and opinions as being a part of a 
political party. 
After the military coup in July 2013, members of the FJP are being detained 
and arrested, including at least two of my interviewees.53 This poses the question if I 
should retain my sources’ anonymity after all. However, I have chosen not to do this. 
I believe there are no answers appearing in this thesis that could incriminate or 
damage any of my interviewees.  
1.4.1 Presentation of Interviewees 
I retrieved information mainly through seven interviews with active members of the 
FJP, during my fieldwork in Cairo from September to the end of November 2012. As 
additional background information, I interviewed two Egyptian journalists, both with 
key knowledge about the situation in Sinai and the political situation in Egypt. 
The first person I interviewed was Hilmi al-Gazzar. Al-Gazzar is a senior 
leader of the MB, and a member of the MB’s Shura council, the Brotherhood’s 
leading organ. Hilmi al-Gazzar was at that time also the leader of the FJP in the 
district of Giza. Being an important figure in the party, he appeared frequently in 
both Egyptian and international media. Al-Gazzar was one of the leaders of the MB’s 
student movement, al-Gamaʿa al-Islamiyya (GI), in the 1970s together with, among 
others, Essam al-Erian, now deputy Chairman of the FJP.  
Dr. Murad Ali was the media advisor during the parliamentary and presidential 
election. During the presidential election, he was initially running the campaign for 
Muhammad Khairat al-Shater, the FJP’s initial presidential candidate. However, 
Shater was disqualified, and Dr. Ali subsequently became the advisor for the recently 
deposed president Muhammad Mursi. 
Ammar Fayad is an active member of FJP and works for the Ikhwan Web, the 
MB official English-language web page, making him informed and updated on the 
MB’s view on the Sinai situation and on FJP’s policy. He has been active in the MB 
                                                
53 "Egypt arrests Muslim Brotherhood-linked cleric Safwat Hegazy," Al-Arabiyya, August 29, 2013, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/08/21/Egypt-arrests-Muslim-Brotherhood-
linked-cleric-Safwat-Hegazy-.html (accessed September 9, 2013); "Brotherhood Leader Gazzar and 
82 Morsi Supporters Arrested in Kafr El-Sheikh," Ikhwan Web, July 6, 2013, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=31103 (accessed September 9, 2013). 
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for more than a decade. Fayad was also frequently in touch with several leaders in 
both the MB and the FJP, arguing that this gave him insight as to their views on the 
Sinai situation.  
Alaʾ Sayyid was during my fieldwork, the leader of the FJP in the area of 
Mukattam, a suburb located in south-eastern Cairo. Although Sayyid is mostly 
concerned with local politics, he take a keen interest in the Sinai issue, and he told 
me that he served as a soldier in Sinai and that he had experienced the situation first 
hand. 
Waleed al-Haddad is a senior member of the MB and a founding member of 
the FJP. Al-Haddad works as a coordinator of FJP’s Foreign Relationship 
Committee, functioning as the second in command. The committee was established 
only months after the founding of the FJP. Waleed was at that time also a member of 
the Executive Board in the FJP. Al-Haddad worked closely with the leader of the 
Foreign Relationship Committee, Amr Darrag, who was considered one of the most 
prominent parliamentary leaders of the FJP during my fieldwork.  
Amr Arfan was the FJP’s assistant secretary in the area of Mukattam and the 
head of the Political Communication Secretariat. Arfan is primarily active in local 
politics, working to improve the relations between the FJP and religious minorities. 
He was eager to talk about Sinai, and told me that he regularly travelled to al-Arish 
and other places in the north. Arfan underlined that he had lived with the Bedouins 
for a longer period of time, and that he was very interested in his party’s view on the 
situation, especially on how they were going to deal with the Bedouins. 
Nussiba Ashraf was at the time of my fieldwork, a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and head of the Research Team. Ashraf often functions as a 
formal representative for the party, both when the party participates at visits abroad 
and when it receives foreign ambassadors. As a result of this, Ashraf needs to be 
updated on the party’s view on issues that concern foreign visitors, such as the Sinai 
situation and the FJP’s policy on this issue. 
I also interviewed Abdelrahman Ayyash. Ayyash was previously a member of 
the MB, but is currently neither a part of the MB or the FJP. Presently, he holds a 
position as a journalist with the International Crisis Group, and I interviewed him 
shortly following his return from an extensive tour of the north of Sinai. I 
furthermore interviewed the present-day editor of the newspaper: “Egypt 
Independent”, named Lina Attalah. Attalah has written extensively about Sinai, 
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especially concerning the situation for Bedouins. Being an editor of a national 
newspaper, Attalah also had a clear view of the current political situation in Sinai 
and what had happened in the peninsula after the revolution. Both Ayyash and 
Attalah stated that they regularly travelled in Sinai, and especially in the northern 
areas. They have interviewed the local population, mostly the Bedouins, on 
numerous occasions over several years, and these two interviews provided me with 
valuable insight as to how the Bedouins themselves describe the situation.  
1.5 Outline of This Thesis  
Before I start to analyse whether or not the FJP was planning to lead a new policy 
towards the Bedouins in Sinai, I will in chapter 2, present a background on Sinai and 
its population. Following that, I will present a short chronology of the violent 
incidents that occurred in Sinai from 2004 - 2013, showing the type of attacks that 
have occurred and who are being targeted. In the same chapter, I will provide 
selected background information on the MB and the creation of the FJP. 
Close to all the sources that I have used, state that the perpetrators of most 
attacks in Sinai are predominantly Bedouins. There are two main causes that are 
repeatedly underlined to explain why the Bedouins are radicalizing: The Mubarak 
policy in Sinai and the emergence of a radical Islamist ideology. In chapter 3, I 
present these two main causes, with all its aspects, in addition to presenting some 
reinforcing factors that have appeared after the revolution. 
In chapter 4, I will present my interviewees’ answers to how they view the 
situation in Sinai. Who do the FJP believe are the perpetrators of the different kinds 
of attacks and why do they believe this is happening? What is the FJP’s perception of 
the situation? This will help to better analyse and understand their plan of action 
towards Sinai, and consequently help to provide a better analysis of the FJP’s policy.  
During my interviews, I asked my sources in the FJP how the party was 
planning to tackle the radicalization of Sinai, and I also asked if they had any 
particular policy towards the Bedouins. In chapter 5, I present my sources answers 
on these question.  
In chapter 6, I compare the Mubarak regime’s policy towards Sinai with the 
FJP’s policy. In the light of the recommendations given by the ICG, the Chatham 
House and the Washington Institute, what are the characteristics of the FJP policy 
and to what extent was the FJP planning to follow these recommendations? How was 
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the FJP planning to approach the Bedouin minority? Though the use the universal 
human rights, or would the party provide the Bedouins with group specific rights like 
self-government rights or polyethnic rights, or both? Did the FJP represent a new 
kind of policy? 
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2 Historical and Regional Background 
2.1 The Sinai Peninsula  
One of the most radical and violent groups emerging in the 1970s was al-Gamaʿa al-
Islamiyya (GI). The GI consisted of mainly people from Upper Egypt, and practically 
all of the major terrorist incidents in Egypt during this period occurred in mainland 
Egypt. Pursuing a violent campaign in the 1990s, GI is said to have been responsible 
for the killing of hundreds of Egyptian policemen and soldiers, secular intellectuals, 
Christian Copts, other civilians and dozens of tourists, culminating in the Luxor 
massacre in 1997 where 68 people were killed, of them 58 foreign tourists.54 The 
attack turned the Egyptian en masse against armed Islamists and the same year 
leaders of GI declared a unilateral ceasefire and later dismantled its armed wings.55 
The period from the Luxor attack and up until the Taba attack in 2004, is 
characterised by virtually no violent Islamist attacks in Egypt, making scholars 
believe that armed struggle (jihad) against the Egyptian state had effectively been 
abandoned. However, the Taba attack marked the beginning of a new wave of 
Islamist violence in Egypt, this time with a change of location, namely Sinai, and a 
change of the perpetrators identity. The group convicted of the attack was consisting 
of mostly Bedouins and Egyptian born Palestinians.  
2.1.1 Regional Background 
With its 61,000 square kilometres the vast, arid areas of the Sinai Peninsula is a link 
between Africa and Asia.56 Located with the Gulf of Suez to the west and the Gulf of 
Aqaba to the east, bounded by the Mediterranean Sea in the north and the Red Sea in 
the south, Sinai has always been an important geopolitical space.57 Until quite 
recently, Sinai served mainly as a formidable “buffer zone” between the Nile Valley 
and its eastern boarders. According to Egyptian analysts, roughly 90 per cent of raids 
into the country throughout history have come through Sinai.58 In modern times, 
several wars have been fought in the area: In 1956, with the nationalization of the 
                                                
54 Lawrence Wright, The looming tower: al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11  (New York: Vintage Books, 
2007); Mohamed Bin-Ali and Rohan Gunaratna, "De-Radicalization Initiatives in Egypt: A 
Preliminary Insight," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 4 (2009): pp.277-91. 
55 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements  
(London: Routledge, 2009). p.1. 
56 See map of Sinai in appendix. 
57 "Egypt`s Sinai Question,"  p.26. 
58 Yaari, "Sinai: A New Front," p.2, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PoilicyNote09.pdf. 
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Suez Canal, the “Six-Day War” in 1967 when Sinai was placed under Israeli control, 
and the Yom Kippur-war of 1973, during which Egypt sought to restore its 
sovereignty over the area.59 
Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin signed the Camp David accords on 17 September 1978. There were two Camp 
David agreements: “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” and “A Framework 
for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel”. The first concerned 
the rights of the Palestinian people, and the other was an important part of the 
process leading towards the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty signed in March 1979.60 
Although al-Sadat managed to regain Sinai, which had been occupied during the 
Yom Kippur War, the peace treaty was not well received by the majority of the 
Egyptian people. Partly as a reaction to the treaty, a radical Islamist assassinated al-
Sadat in 1981.61 The agreement divided Sinai into three zones that were to be 
gradually demilitarized. In 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was 
created to guarantee the new “buffer zone” status of Sinai. The mission of this 
independent international organization is to supervise the implementation of the 
treaty and to prevent any violation of its terms.62 The MFO has per 2012, 1,656 
military personnel supplied by twelve countries in the demilitarized border zone. In 
2005, after Israel’s withdrawal, and in 2007, after Hamas’ electoral victory in Gaza, 
the MFO’s mandate was expanded to ensure that the augmented Egyptian presence 
along the Gaza border was consistent with the treaty.63 
The Sinai is divided into two governorates: North and South Sinai. Although 
Sinai is almost twice the size of Egypt’s Nile Valley and Delta, the population is 
estimated to be around 550,000, unevenly distributed. Around 400,000 people live in 
North Sinai province, and about 145,000 of them, live in or around the provincial 
capital al-Arish. In the mountainous South Sinai lives a further 165,000 people.64  
The Bedouins in the two provinces constitute approximately 70 per cent of the 
Sinai population. Their majority, however, has been reduced by rapid labour 
migration from the Nile Valley. The migrants, referred to by the Bedouins as “the 
                                                
59 Alberto Siliotti, Sinai  (Cairo: Cairo Press, 2000). p.31. 
60 Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace  (New York: Routledge, 1999). pp.229-54. 
61 Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements: p.2. 
62 "The Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)". 
63 David Schenker, "The MFO Under Fire in Sinai," Policywatch (2012): 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-mfo-under-fire-in-sinai. 
64 Pelham, "Sinai: The Buffer Erodes," p.1. 
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Egyptians”, make up around 10 per cent. Another important minority in Sinai are the 
Palestinians.65 There are also about 10 per cent Palestinians, primarily represented in 
the areas close to the Gaza and Israeli borders such as Shaykh Zuwayid and Rafah.66  
Historically, Sinai is referred to as the land of the badu, or the Bedouins, the 
people of the desert. The tribes are said to originate from the Arabian Peninsula and 
the countries of the Levant.67 They are the largest indigenous group in Egypt, next to 
the Berbers and the Nubians. In the 1890s, Bedouins in all of Egypt, comprised as 
much as 10 per cent of the total population, while in 1990 the total number of 
Bedouins in Egypt ranged between 500 000 and 1 million, less than 1 per cent of the 
country’s population.68 Although a minority in the country, the Bedouins are still a 
majority in Sinai. They are divided amongst roughly 20 tribes with between 500 and 
25,000 people each.69 Along the border region, from north to south, the Tarabin, the 
Tayaha, the Azazma and the Ahaywat are dominant tribes. The three latter also 
dominate most of central Sinai, whose territories extend as far as Israel and the West 
Bank. Among the most important in the northeast along the Mediterranean coast, are 
the Sawarka and the Rumaylat. They are settled in the al-Arish, Shaykh Zuwayid. To 
the west, the majority are the Masaʾid, the Bayyadiyya and the Dawaghra. In the 
south, the majority groups are the Tuwara, a confederation of tribes, including the 
Alayqa, Awlad Saʾid and Muzayna, who live in the Sharm al-Shaykh region, in the 
mountains of the interior and especially in the Dahab area.70 
Today, most of the tribes are sedentary, living in territories governed by 
agreements between the groups in accordance with customary law.71 The Bedouin 
identity is very closed linked to religion and tribe belonging. When researchers from 
the ICG asked Bedouins to define their identity, they answered: 
 
“I am a Muslim, an Arab, a Tarabin Bedouin, from Sinai and from Egypt”, a Bedouin from 
Nuwayba’ told the Crisis Group (…). “I am a Muslim from the Sawarka tribe (qabila), and the 
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Abu Shafi family (‘aila), a Bedouin (badu), an Arab, and my nationality is Egyptian (gansiyya 
misriyya)”, said an al-Arish resident.  
 
Thus, “the Bedouin identity is no longer expressed in terms of a specific way of life 
– nomadism – but in terms of belonging to a group that defines itself as such.”72 The 
Bedouins have retained their own distinct culture, and even today, they have not 
adopted the Egyptian dialect of Arabic.73 The Bedouins claim to be ashraf, meaning 
that they decent in a straight lineage from Muhammad himself.74 Thus, in many 
ways, ethnically, historically and linguistically, the indigenous Bedouin population 
has closer ties to the lands to its east than to its west.75  
Egypt has, from the year of reunification (1982), considered the Sinai-question 
as, above all, a matter of population settlement, and has encouraged Egyptians from 
the Nile Valley to move to Sinai by offering attractive salaries and public sector 
employment. The migrants are distinguished predominantly by dialect and settlement 
patterns, they are often settled together according to their village or governorate of 
origin. The Egyptians are also distinguished by their economic activity, working 
mostly in the tourism industry.76  
2.1.2 The Emergence of Radical Islamism in Sinai (2004-2010)   
The ICG report’s opening line states that: “Terrorism returned to Egypt in 2004 after 
an absence of seven years with successive attacks and the emergence of a heretofore 
unknown movement in Sinai.” 77 The period from 2004-2006 is marked by three 
waves of attacks in Taba (2004), in Sharm al-Shaykh (2005) and in Dahab (2006), 
causing more than 130 fatalities combined.78 Prior to 2004, almost all violent 
incidents associated with Islamist extremism had taken place in mainland Egypt and 
especially Upper Egypt. The attack in Taba was the first terrorist attack in Sinai and 
this was also the first time that Bedouins allegedly were the perpetrators.79  
On October 7, 2004, a truck drove into the lobby of the Taba Hilton Hotel and 
exploded, killing 31 and wounding approximately 150 people. At a campsite often 
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used by Israelis, two more car-bombings occurred. Of all the 34 who died in the twin 
bombings (including the perpetrators), 13 were from Israel, two from Italy, one from 
Russia, and one from the United States. The remaining fatalities were believed to be 
Egyptians.80 Short after the attack, the Egyptian government detained and killed 
several members of a local Bedouin tribe whom they believed to be responsible.81  
On July 23, 2005, a series of suicide bomb attacks hit the Egyptian resort city 
of Sharm al-Shaykh, resulting in at least 70 fatalities and wounding between 150 and 
200 people.82 This incident stands as the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt’s history. 
Although Britons, Germans, Italians, Israelis and Americans were among the 
fatalities, the majority of the casualties were Egyptians.83 Again the government 
detained and killed suspected perpetrators in the northern city al-Arish.84 
On April 24, 2006, three bombs exploded, this time in Dahab, causing 23 
casualties and wounding around 80. It appears that a pair of bombs was detonated at 
two restaurants and a third at a supermarket. Again the majority of the victims were 
Egyptians.85 Two days after the Dahab bombings, the government killed or detained 
virtually all members of a network that was situated in the northern Sinai, 
“seemingly ending a wave of terror targeting the tourism industry”.86 
Several previously unknown groups claimed responsibility for the three attacks 
in Sinai. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was the first group to claim 
responsibility of the Taba bombings, their statement coming two days after the 
attack. They also claimed responsibility for the Sharm al-Shaykh attack, however, 
not for the Dahab attack. Another group, al-Mujahidin fi-Misr (MM) claimed that 
they were behind the Taba attack, but not for the other attacks.87 Al-Gamaʿa a-
Islamiyya al-Alamiyya (GIA) claimed the responsibility for all three attacks. 
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Ultimately, the Egyptian authority announced that members of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 
(TWJ), that had clamed responsibility for all three attacks, were the perpetrators.88  
These three attacks were similar in method as they all used three bombs that 
targeted civilians. Similarly, all of the attacks took place on or around symbolic dates 
in Egyptian history. October 6th is the anniversary of the army’s crossing of the Suez 
Canal in 1973, while July 23rd commemorates the 1952 revolution and April 24th is 
the eve of the anniversary of Israel’s 1982 withdrawal from Sinai. These attacks also 
occurred on or around Jewish holidays. The Taba attack occurred during the Jewish 
Sukkot festival, and the attack in Sharm al-Shaykh occurred one day before the 
Jewish fast day Tammuz, commemorating the breach of the walls of Jerusalem 
before the destruction of the Second Temple. It falls on the 17th day of the Hebrew 
month of Tammuz and in 2005 that date was July 24.89 The Dahab attack in 2006 
coincides with the newest Jewish holiday, Yom ha-shoʾa, which commemorates 
Holocaust. 90  Furthermore, it also coincides with Sham al-Nassim, an Egyptian 
national holiday marking the beginning of spring. The holiday dates from the time of 
the Pharaohs and is celebrated by all the country’s religious faiths. Additionally, the 
Egyptian Copts celebrated Easter on April 23.91  
This led investigators to believe that one group with one agenda executed all 
the attacks, namely the TWJ. The TWJ members were mostly Bedouins and men of 
Palestinian origin, living in northern Sinai, specifically the al-Arish district.92 
Owing to the Sinai bombings, the Egyptian state conducted a brutal crackdown 
in the area, resulting in the imprisonment of thousands of people. Human rights 
organisations reported that there had been extensive use of arbitrary arrests and 
torture. Perhaps as a result, there was not a single attack in Sinai in 2007, and less 
than five attacks from 2008 to the end of 2010.  
In November 2008, armed Bedouins in Sinai abducted 25 policemen and 
briefly held them captive, releasing them the same day.93 On April 22 and August 2, 
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2010, rockets were fired from Sinai towards Eilat in Israel and Aqaba in Jordan. In 
the first attack no one was injured, however, in the second attack two rockets fell in 
Aqaba in front of a hotel, killing a Jordanian taxi driver. Israeli media reported that a 
squad from Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was behind 
the two rocket attacks, though Hamas denied any involvement.94 On June 27, 2010, 
unknown perpetrators bombed the pipeline between Egypt and Jordan. One source 
claims that the perpetrators were a group of Bedouins, consisting of at least a dozen 
armed fugitives.95 The attack was reportedly in retaliation for several arrests of 
female Bedouins some days earlier.96  
2.1.3 After the Revolution (2011-2013)       
The Egyptian revolution of 2011, took a different form in Sinai than in the rest of Egypt. 
Bedouin groups overpowered government forces using arms smuggled from Gaza and 
Libya. They managed to destroy important security institutions, like the regional 
headquarters of State Security in al-Arish, and Rafah’s passport and permit office – 
an institution that had restricted Bedouin movement to the tourist resorts in the 
south.97 Reportedly, there have been at least 35 violent incidents in the peninsula 
since early 2011 until August 2012, resulting in the deaths of more than 50 
policemen and soldiers.98 Crime has risen and religious conservatism and sectarian 
tension also increased. In Sinai there have been attacks on both Christian and Sufi 
establishments.99  
On July 29, 2011, Bedouins and police clashed in the city of al-Arish, killing 
three civilians and three security officers and wounding 19 others. After this clash, 
pamphlets entitled “Statement from al-Qaida in the Sinai Peninsula” were circulated. 
The statement called for creating an Islamic emirate in the Sinai, implementing 
sharia law, shelving the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, halting discrimination against 
                                                
94 "Hamas operatives were responsible for the two rocket attacks on Eilat and Aqaba," The Meir Amit 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 15, 2010, http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/en/article/18048 (accessed September 2, 2012). 
95 "Egypt tightens security around pipeline for Israel-bound gas," AFP, June 28, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2aK0v_4IxpvzZ9I8kk2plHbtNAg (accessed 
August 8, 2012). 
96 "Sinai: The international gas pipeline that transports gas to Jordan and Syria has been bombed ", [in 
Arabic], Akhbar al-Arab, June 28, 2010, http://www.akhbaralarab.net/index.php/regional/25948-
2010-06-28-07-59-55 (accessed August 2, 2012). 
97 Pelham, "Salvaging Sinai." 
98 "In Egypt's chaotic Sinai, militants grow stronger," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, August 9, 2012, 
http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=1&id=30632 (accessed August 10, 2012). 
99 Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt in Transition," (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), p.6. 
 25 
the Sinai’s Bedouin tribes and demanding Egyptian military intervention in support 
of the Hamas regime in Gaza.100  
A man named Muhammad Eid Hamid, also known as Muhammad al-Tihi, 
seem to be involved in several of the more recent terrorist attacks. In addition to 
being one of the perpetrators in the attack on July 29, 2011, he was also accused of 
being involved in planning a cross-border attack that occurred on the August 18, 
2011, killing 8 Israelis. Al-Tihi is believed to be the leader of a new group 
established after the revolution, sometimes referred to as al-Takfir wal-Jihad 
(TKWJ).101 The TKWJ-movement is said to follow al-Qaida ideologically and 
demands an end to any foreign military and tourist presence in the Sinai Peninsula.102  
In December 2011, the gas line was blown up for the tenth time that year. A 
group calling itself Ansar al-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula (AJSP) claimed 
responsibility in an online message, where it also professed its loyalty to the 
teachings of “the martyr Osama bin-Laden”.103 Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida 's new 
leader, has praised the pipeline bombings. On February 5, 2012, the pipeline was 
attacked again, and this attack was also claimed by AJSP, saying it was in retaliation 
for the death of the group's leader, the previously mentioned al-Tihi, who supposedly 
died under torture on February 3, 2012.104 
On June 18, 2012, an Israeli construction worker was killed on the Egyptian-
Israeli border. A team of Israel Defence Forces (IDF) soldiers quickly responded, 
killing two of the attackers and causing the others to flee.105 A group calling itself the 
Majlis al-Shura lil-Mujahidin fil-Quds (MSC) claimed responsibility for the ambush. 
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The perpetrators included an Egyptian and a Saudi. They reportedly sought revenge 
for “Muslims’ blood” and dedicated this attack to Ayman al-Zawahri.106 
On July 22, 2012, the pipeline was blown up for the fifteenth time. The attack 
was the first to take place after the newly elected President Mursi assumed office, 
and the first after Egypt terminated the gas deal with Israel. The incident showed that 
despite the termination of the gas deal, the pipeline was seemingly in use.107 A new 
Jihadi group named Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) reportedly claimed responsibility 
for this attack in an online video. This group also claim to be a branch of al-Qaida.108 
Another group calling itself Ansar al-Haqq (AH) released a video online, 
featuring gunmen wearing ski masks training with weapons in the Sinai desert. One 
of the videos showed the men patrolling the streets of a northern Sinai town, waving 
assault rifles and grenade launchers. A group calling itself Jund al-Sharia, (JS) 
announced in an online statement in August 2012 that it would wage jihad against 
“the current tyrant of Egypt (...) until they implement God’s Sharia in the land”.109 JS 
made several demands, among them the establishment of Islamic law throughout 
Egypt, beginning in Sinai, as well as the withdrawal of the MFO peacekeepers in the 
Peninsula.110 
The core al-Qaida, lead by al-Zawahiri, has not yet acknowledged any of the 
above-mentioned groups as official branches of the movement.111  
On August 5, 2012, armed men, reportedly foreign fighters, attacked two 
security checkpoints for the Egyptian army, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers. The 
perpetrators also injured seven others. The attack happened at the Karem Abu Salem 
crossing in North Sinai - on the border between Egypt and Israel. The gunmen 
barrelled into Israel in the stolen vehicles and Israeli Air Force struck one vehicle, 
while the other exploded at the border. It was later reported that six of the attackers 
had been killed at the border and that 10 people were believed to have carried out the 
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attack. While the identities of the perpetrators remain unclear, media reports from 
Egypt and elsewhere have all highlighted local Bedouin involvement.112 Others have 
claimed the Palestinian extremist group Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam, AI) was 
behind the attack, while the group itself has not verified the claim.113 
In March 2012, around 300 persons identified as Bedouins, armed with 
automatic rifles, surrounded a MFO base holding hundreds hostage for nearly a 
week, refusing to allow troops to leave or provisions to enter. Their aim was to 
pressure the Egyptian government to release five tribesmen facing possible sentences 
of death or life in prison for their alleged role in the 2005 bombings of the Sharm al-
Shaykh.114 Also in September 2012 the MFO was attacked when dozens of armed 
men broke into their base and raised the black flag of Jihad. This was in connection 
to a region-wide protests by salafi groups against an anti-Muslim video by an 
American filmmaker. The group demanded the withdrawal of MFO forces.115  
Up until this incident, the SCAF-lead government had not addressed the 
deterioration of security in Sinai. However, after the attack on August 5, on August 
8, the newly instated government under Mursi, announced the Operation Eagle, - a 
security operation initially designed to secure vital establishments in Sinai- in order 
to combat the militants, declaring that the operation would not stop until “all terrorist 
and criminal activity is quashed”.116 The military operation launched in August was 
the largest military operation in Sinai since 1973. At least 52 militants were reported 
killed, over 30 arrested, and tunnels to Gaza were also destroyed. It seemed that the 
situation calmed down after the military offensive, and between September 2012 and 
June 2013, only six deadly attacks have taken place, for the most part aimed at the 
Egyptian security, resulting in less than ten casualties on both sides.117 On the other 
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side, there were close to a dozen kidnappings of tourists by Bedouins demanding the 
release of relatives from prison. Most of the time, the tourists were released 
unharmed only hours afterward.118 Mursi and the FJP have been accused of being 
“too soft” in their approach to Sinai, allegedly being reluctant to “employ heavy-
handed tactics to stop the increasing flow of arms and militants into the 
peninsula”.119 Mursi was further accused of being “naive and unfit to rule” because 
of his approach of “mediation with tribal chiefs, rather than the standard military 
response”.120  
After the military coup, the violence has intensified resulting in a spike in 
clashes between the military and the militants, resulting in at least 130 casualties on 
both sides.121 On September 11, 2013, suicide bombers killed at least six soldiers in 
two separate attacks in Sinai, “as the new government said it was stepping up its 
crackdown on Islamist militants there and also appeared to be moving against non-
Islamist voices of dissent”.122 
Bedouin leaders and Islamists in the Sinai say locals have been angered by the 
coup because it brought an end to Egypt’s nascent democracy. Both police 
commanders and Bedouin leaders agree that the militants are a minority, but say they 
fear that Sinai’s population may get swept up in the military’s crackdown, escalating 
the conflict into a wider war, adding that Mursi’s rule offered some respite from the 
repression, a new kind of freedom. One Bedouin smuggler said: “Nothing happened 
the year that Mursi was in power,” explaining “Mursi had no control here. But at 
least he didn’t insult or arrest anyone. When you would pass by the checkpoints, they 
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would respect you. Now we’re back to the way it was before.” 123 After the coup, the 
Egyptian security forces have locked down the single bridge that connects the 
peninsula to the mainland, set up a series of checkpoints, and the Sinai Bedouin say 
they feel as if the state once again is targeting them.124 
2.2 The Freedom and Justice Party  
On February 21, 2011, only ten days after Egypt’s previous dictator Hosni Mubarak, 
was forced to resign due to the popular uprising initiating the Egyptian revolution, 
the MB announced their intention of founding a political party entitled the Freedom 
and Justice Party (FJP).125 As 70 per cent of the FJP founders are active members of 
the MB, the relationship between the MB and the FJP quickly became an issue that 
needed resolving. In August 2011, the FJP released a statement clarifying its 
relationship with the MB, emphasizing that the party is an independent party that 
shares the same background as the Brotherhood.126 The statement added that the MB 
represents the main social base for the party, and is its primary supporter. It thus 
appears to be some degree of coordination between the party and the MB concerning 
all the social and political activities.127 The MB leadership appointed Muhammad 
Mursi as the party’s first Chairman, Essam al-Erian as vice president and Saad al-
Katatny as secretary general. The latter was elected the current leader in the party’s 
first open internal elections last October 2012.128  
2.2.1 The Party’s Origin: The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood is usually referred to as the first Islamic organisation in the 
world and was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928.129 The MB started as a religious 
social organization, focusing its activities on preaching Islam, teaching the illiterate, 
setting up hospitals and even launching commercial enterprises. Although originally 
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an Islamic welfare organization, the MB worked for a reformation of the Egyptian 
social system, the economic system, as well as the political system along Islamic 
lines. The MB grew rapidly in popularity and number, and by 1946-1948, it had two 
thousand branches, and is believed to have had over half a million members and 
around half a million sympathizers.130  
The MB’s ideology is rooted in the belief that the Islamic community has been 
in decline since the end of the period of “the four righty guided caliphs”, al-rashidun 
(632-661) that led the Islamic community after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad.131 According to the MB, the caliphs had led the community in line with 
(the true) Islam and their authority was rooted in the will of the people. The MB’s 
view is that corrupt and authoritarian leaders, Western imperialism and the growing 
secularism have weakened the Egyptian society. To strengthen Egypt and the role of 
Islam in the world, the MB believes that it was, and is, necessary to revitalize Islam 
and strengthen the role of religion in society.132  
As the MB continued to rise in influence in the 1940s, the organization became 
more engaged in Egypt’s turbulent political life. The organization began to oppose 
British rule in Egypt and worked for the Palestinian cause.133 Later, the MB also 
played a supporting role in the 1952 revolution, eager to be a part of the new political 
regime. This military coup d’état was lead by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and between 
1952-1954 the MB enjoyed a period of tolerance from the new regime and was 
allowed to continue their activities despite the fact that political parties and 
organizations were dissolved. 134  In 1954, an assassination attempt directed at 
president Nasser, supposedly by a MB member, lead to a complete ban of the group. 
Several key members of the organization were arrested. Over the next few weeks, it 
was announced that as many as 1,000 members of the MB were arrested. In the 
succeeding military trial, seven people were sentenced to death.135 
After this incident, the MB had to go underground, and many of its members 
went in exile. It was not until Anwar al-Sadat had been instated as a president (in 
1971), that the majority of the MB leadership was released from jail and gradually 
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got the chance to work in the Egyptian society as a welfare movement, although still 
banned as a political party.136 Umar Tilmisani, who became the MB leader in 1972, 
publically renounced violence as a strategy.137 
Following the MB official renouncement of violence, several new radical 
groups disagreeing with the decision emerged. These new groups were aiming to 
overthrow the secular regime and establish an Islamic state by means of violence. 
There are a number of factors that led to the proliferation of radical groups in Egypt 
and across the Muslim world in the 1970s. Different scholars have identified and 
stressed different factors, but central for most of them are; the reaction to 
modernization, Western encroachment, tyrannical rule and corruption by the national 
elite, gross inequality, poverty and lack of economic development.138 The MB 
concerned itself with many of the same causes, however committed to a peaceful 
method. 
Then, in 1981 a violent radical Islamist group assassinated al-Sadat, and the 
Emergency Law was implemented. Although it was supposed to be effective for only 
one year, it was operative throughout Mubarak’s rule.139 The law empowered the 
State Security Investigations apparatus (SSI) to arrest anyone, anytime, without an 
arrest warrant. The SSI did not have to follow the law regulating criminal procedures 
in arrests: “protection of general security” was sufficient to justification for arrests.140 
The SSI also had the power to renew detention orders indefinitely without charges. 
As with other authoritarian regimes, the SSI undertook the role of repressing political 
opponents and thwarting potential voices of dissidence. A growing number of human 
rights reports have pointed to the repressive role of the SSI Egyptian politics during 
the Mubarak regime, in particular, with respect to the extensive use of torture and 
disappearances. The main SSI target of arrests, detention and torture has been 
Islamists from different factions, including the MB.141 After the 9/11, the Egyptian 
government committed to the “war on terrorism”, and started to label any group that 
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threatened status quo as a “terrorist organization,” without any thought to the origins 
of or reasons for the struggle being waged. Military courts that exclude the right of 
appeal were created, laws were enacted to restrict freedom of the press and prevent 
elected Islamists from leading professional associations.142  
During the Mubarak regime the MB was still denied the right to form a 
political party. However in 1984, the organisation started to field independent 
candidates in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, sometimes in coalition with other 
parties. In both 2000 and 2005, candidates from the MB had relative success despite 
the arrests and harassment of voters who sympathized with them. In the 2005-
elections, it managed to obtain twenty per cent of the seats of the legislature’s Lower 
House, becoming the largest opposition group in the Assembly’s history predating 
the 2011 revolution.143 Many expected the MB to repeat its success in the 2010 
parliamentary election. However, the state heavily manipulated this election in 
favour of the National Democratic Party (NDP). There have been speculations that 
this action only further resulted in an even bigger popular support for the MB 
organization.144 
During the 1990s and 2000s, as the MB became increasingly political, several 
members of the MB demanded internal reform, pushing for a revision of the MB’s 
ideology, including its positions on party pluralism and women's rights. There was 
also criticism directed at the old guard’s monopoly of power within the 
Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau.145  From 1994 an onwards, the MB published 
several declarations and statements to clarify their view on several subjects. In 2007, 
the MB published a draft of a political party platform. The MB still did not have any 
legal recognition in Egypt and the prospect of legal recognition for a MB-founded 
party seem distant. However, the platform was a way for the MB leadership to 
clearly signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so. The platform 
emphasized freedom of religion and expression, pluralistic politics, property rights, 
women’s enfranchisement, and state sovereignty. On the other side, the content 
proved to be controversial, also within the MB, as it also called for the establishment 
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of a council of elected senior religious scholars, effectively placing the government 
under the scrutiny of an extra-constitutional entity—a return from more moderate 
positions previously advocated. This reaction points to an internal disagreement 
within the MB, a sign of continued different tendencies, which have been present 
since the 1990s, between a conservative and a reformist wing, and also a generation 
conflict between the old and the new guard.146   
2.2.2 The Creation of the Freedom and Justice Party  
It appears as if the more moderate tendencies have won precedency in the FJP’s 
program, where the debated issues from the 2007 platform are omitted.147 The FJP 
election program of 2011 is 49 pages long in Arabic and 45 pages long in English, 
and is divided into five chapters.148 The first chapter is headlined: Urgent Issues, and 
underline the need to reform Egypt’s security system, address the economic situation 
and fight corruption. Especially the reform of the security forces is underlined: 
 
Re-training and re-qualifying employees in the Police Force through extensive courses on how 
to best deal with the citizens, living the slogans "The police is in the service of the people" and 
"A person is innocent until proven guilty", to show their own I.D. cards to citizens and to read 
the rights of the accuses to him or here, including the right to a lawyer, immediately after 
arrests (…)149 
 
Chapter two addresses the issues of political reform. The program states that the state 
is based on the principle of citizenship, where all citizens enjoy equal rights and 
duties guaranteed by law in accordance with the principles of equality and equal 
opportunities, without discrimination because of religion, colour, gender or race. 
Here the party also addresses Christians and states that all Egyptians are equal and 
the importance of safeguarding citizenship rights, and the maintenance of national 
unity. The term “minorities” is mentioned only once while the “Bedouins” is not 
mentioned at all. In the media, the FJP has continuously stressed their will to include 
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“all Egyptians”, and frequently point to the party’s initial membership of nearly nine 
thousand, which included one thousand women and one hundred Copts. The FJP 
stresses the need for democracy and labels itself a civil party, although Islam 
remains  the party’s chief frame of reference, and religion has a presence throughout 
its party platform.150  
In chapter three, which is about social justice, the FJP says the state should 
secure justice, equality and equal opportunities to all citizens. Their priorities are to 
address the high cost of living, fight poverty and unemployment, and improve 
conditions of workers and farmers, people with special needs and pensioners, in 
addition to addressing the concern of street children.  
Chapter four is titled Integrated Development and focuses on a suitable 
environment, the right to education and the right to health care.151 This chapter also 
underline the FJP’s goal to establish national projects with geographical dimensions, 
giving priority to projects for the development of Sinai.152 The program emphasizes 
the need to re-plan urban and population layout in Sinai, “and using Egyptian land, 
wealth and resources in a scientific and practical approach, to serve national security 
strategies.”153 In the program, the FJP argue that the security and safety of Egypt is 
best achieved though development: 
 
Re-planning urban and population layout of the state in general, and in Sinai in particular, and 
using Egyptian lands, wealth and resources in a scientific and practical approach, to serve 
national security strategies.154 
 
The last chapter is called Regional Leadership. According to the program, there has 
been a significant decline of Egypt’s leading role. To regain its prior position as a 
leading country in the Arab world, the FJP states that it is important to maintain 
peaceful relations with “all countries, nations and institutions of international 
regulation, promoting mutual respect and equal relations, and supporting 
international peace, justice and security.”155 The program also underlines that Egypt 
shall respect international law covenants and conventions on human rights. In this 
section the FJP also affirms “the right of the Palestinian people to liberate their 
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land”, and that especially Egypt should “aid and support the Palestinian people and 
the Palestinian resistance against the Zionist usurpers of their homeland”.156  
After the 2011 revolution, Egypt has completed both a parliamentary and a 
presidential election. The FJP won a decisive plurality in both houses of parliament 
during the winter 2011 – 2012 elections.157 Also in Sinai did the FJP become the 
biggest party with 39,8 per cent of the votes in South Sinai and 35,3 per cent in 
North Sinai.158 Then, two days before the presidential election in June 2012, the 
parliament was dissolved after the court found the voting system to be 
unconstitutional. Egyptian parliamentary elections were expected to be held in 2013, 
but were postponed. On July 8, 2013, Interim President Adly Mansour issued a 
constitutional declaration in which the year was adjusted to 2014.159 
In the latter part of May 2012 a presidential election in Egypt was held. 
Initially the FJP nominated Khairat al-Shater as presidential candidate, a decision 
supported by the MB. However, Shater was later disqualified, and Muhammad 
Mursi, who was initially nominated as a backup candidate, emerged as the new 
contestant. In addition to being the party’s chairman at that point, Mursi had previous 
experience as a politician, being a Member of Parliament in the People's Assembly 
of Egypt from 2000 to 2005 as a MB independent candidate.160 On June 24, 2012, it 
was declared that Mursi had won the presidential election by a narrow margin over 
Ahmed Shafik. The commission said Mursi took 51,7 per cent of the vote versus 
48,3 per cent for Shafik. This was the first election victory of an Islamist as head of 
state in the Arab world.161 After his victory had been announced, Mursi resigned 
from both the MB and FJP, fulfilling a campaign promise vowing to become a 
“president of all Egyptians”.162  
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After June 30, 2012, when Mursi was sworn in as the fifth Egyptian president, 
the first democratically elected, he appointed Hesham Qandil as Prime Minister. 
Qandil was sworn in on August 2, 2012. Five of the 35 ministers appointed in the 
Cabinet, were members of the FJP.163 On January 5, 2013, ten ministers were 
changed and after the reshuffle, the number of the FJP members in the Cabinet 
became eight.164 Then, again, on May 7, 2013, nine ministers were also changed 
increasing the number of the FJP members to 12 out of total 35, importantly taking 
the ministry of finance.165 One can argue that the FJP was the most potent political 
party in Egypt post-revolution and pre-military coup. On the other side, the highest-
profile ministries: those of the interior, defence, communication and finance, were 
not occupied by FJP-members, with the exception of finance that was under the FJP 
for about a month. There were at least seven ministers in the Cabinet with strong ties 
to the military and the Mubarak regime, including the key minister positions like the 
ministry of foreign affairs, finance, interior affairs and the ministry of defence.166 
On June 30, 2013, massive demonstrations were held across Egypt calling for 
President Mursi’s resignation from office. At the same time Mursi- supporters held 
demonstrations elsewhere in Cairo. On July 3, 2013, Abdul Fatah al-Sisi announced 
a road map for the future, stating that Mursi was removed and that the head of the 
Constitutional Court had been appointed the Interim President of Egypt.  
3 Explaining the Sinai Radicalization 
In the first chapter, I presented several policy recommendations that the ICG, the 
Chatham House and the Washington Institute address to the Egyptian government. 
The recommendations are grounded on research seeking to explain the radicalization. 
The researchers underlined different aspects of the situation as important to explain 
its emergence. However, all of them, in various degrees, blamed the Mubarak 
regime’s policy for the Sinai insurgency. In this chapter, I will present the different 
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explanations as to why Sinai is radicalizing based on the above-mentioned research, 
supplemented by explanations visible in other research and in the media. 
 These explanations seek to identify the perpetrators of the various attacks and 
the motives behind these actions. As most sources argue that the perpetrators of the 
various attacks in Sinai from 2004 to 2013 are predominantly, local Bedouins, I have 
divided this chapter into sections that underline what have caused the perpetrators to 
rebel, while also addressing the issue of the perpetrators identity. 
3.1 The Policy of the Mubarak Regime 
Awaiting Israel’s withdrawal from the peninsula in 1982, the local population 
expected the Egyptian authority to invest in and develop Sinai. President Anwar al-
Sadat had ambitious plans for the development of the peninsula. The plan consisted 
of settling no less than 5 million people in the peninsula, to bring fresh water from 
the Nile all the way up to the Israeli border and he also marked some 643,000 acres 
for irrigation and agricultural cultivation in different parts of the desert. However, the 
assassination of al-Sadat in 1981 put his plans on hold.167  
3.1.1 Neglect and Lack of Development 
In 1994, president Mubarak revised the Sinai development plan, reducing the 
settlement plans to 2,9 million Egyptians in the peninsula by 2018. Although the 
settlement numbers were reduced, the plan would, if successfully implemented, still 
turn the indigenous Bedouin into a small minority. Approximately 75 billion 
Egyptian pounds were allocated for the plan, which aimed to further develop local 
mineral resources in addition to increase the area of cultivated lands. However, 
Mubarak’s closest advisors convinced him to give up the Sinai project in favour of 
the Toshka Project, aimed at creating a “second Nile Valley” in southern Egypt. By 
1997, the peninsula had returned to the bottom of the government’s priorities list.168  
Despite the fact that the government did not reach its “population goal” the 
tourism industry has unquestionably been a successful and strategic economic 
activity in the region’s development. In 2003, South Sinai was attracting over 2,6 
million tourists annually, and tens of thousands Egyptians moved there attracted by 
job prospects and internal tourism, including time-share holiday homes.169As a 
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consequence, south Sinai has the second highest income level of Egypt’s 26 
provinces, unemployment is low and literacy is above the national average, most of 
this owing to its tourism and oil production.170 However, there are big inequalities in 
the distribution of capital accumulated as a result of this industry. As the Nile Valley 
migrants are being systematically favoured, this wealth has not trickled down to the 
local population.171 
The North governorate, where the majority of the Sinai population live, is one 
of Egypt’s poorest governorates, and water is a crucial problem.172 In the least 
developed areas, schools can be as much as five kilometres away and in most areas, 
there is a lack of basic infrastructure, like proper roads, water supply and electricity 
grids. For many in central Sinai, the closest hospitals are over 400 kilometres 
away.173 In all of Sinai, there are few educational opportunities, only one private 
university in Sinai with high tuition fees.174  
3.1.2 Discrimination and Suppression 
The Bedouins have not just been subject to neglect, but also to discrimination and 
suppression. The ICG report states that the minorities in Sinai are  
 
socially, culturally and economically discriminated against and constrained, on a daily basis, 
by security measures: in the north, because of the problematic border with Gaza and, in the 
south, in order to protect foreign tourists.175 
 
The some of the most important issues are the dispossession of traditional Bedouin 
land and the denial of Bedouin ownership rights, the barring of Bedouins from the 
military and most security services, and the continued undermining of their distinct 
culture as the government promote the Pharaonic heritage at the expense of the 
Bedouin traditions. In Pelham quotes a female Bedouin from North Sinai saying: 
“We’re always hearing about terror cells in Sinai bent on destroying the country, but 
the cause of the violence is popular. If I am not given my equal rights, I will 
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explode.”176 Various Bedouin leaders, demonstrators and unknown perpetrator of 
attacks, have demanded that the government should grant citizenship to the more 
than 100,000 Bedouin who remain noncitizens, provide public services, and various 
other basic services and infrastructure, in addition to abolishing the list of 10,000 
“wanted” tribesmen (many of whom were sentenced in absentia) and to release 
detained Bedouins.177 
Customary laws, applied by Bedouin families that have been urbanized and 
settled for several generations, essentially govern land ownership in Sinai. The 
principle of wadʿa al-yad (meaning ‘to put down you hand’) gives de facto property 
rights to a tribe, family or one of its members who settles on virgin land.178 However, 
the land is not property and gives no inheritance rights.179 In 1988, a law that initially 
was meant to permit private ownership in the peninsula basically made the whole 
Sinai government property.180 The law had a devastating effect on the Bedouins as 
their land claims were not legally recognized, and they were subsequently displaced 
from areas of interest, especially along the costal strip, with no government 
compensation.181 The Egyptian government was in need of a new tourist location, as 
the Nile Valley from 1992 to 1994, experienced a drastic fall in tourist revenues 
caused by repeatedly terrorist attacks by the JI. The private sector was encouraged to 
invest as the government was selling land at one dollar per sq. metre, but rarely was 
land sold to any Bedouins.182 The ICG report states: “During the last fifteen years, all 
building plots have been allocated to Egyptian and foreign companies investing in 
tourism”.183 The Bedouin tribes have been pushed from the southern coast into the 
hinterland and was hindered from taking part in the new economically development. 
In the north, the development projects including the construction of an industrial 
zone, the opening of agro-businesses and the laying of the gas pipeline to Israel and 
Jordan, are also perceived as a means to repossess Bedouin land while sharing few, if 
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any, of the benefits. 184  The re-population project became a way to solve 
unemployment and housing issues in the urban centre.185 Another reason for not 
granting the Bedouins landownership rights was concerns among state officials that 
the Bedouins would sell the land to Israelis that would use “their greater purchasing 
power to secure control of land in Egypt’s strategic land-bridge to Asia.”186 During 
the last couple of years, the Bedouins have started to demand compensation for state 
use of land considered by the Bedouins to be “tribal land”.187 
Conscription is compulsory in Egypt for males of ages between 18 and 30 
years. They are however excused from service if they do not have male siblings or 
hold a dual citizenship. Most Bedouins received Egyptian citizenship in 1906, 
resulting in the transfer of Sinai to the Egyptian government, however, many have 
dual citizenship, and around 100,000 of the Bedouin population, do not hold any 
kind of citizenship, meaning that they are not conscribed to the army, and that they 
cannot vote.188 In practise, most Bedouins were barred from the military and most 
security services. Pelham states that while they were “spared Egypt’s military draft, 
they lost access to the state benefits and job opportunities that accrued from military 
service”.189 It was not until September 2011, Egypt’s military training college in 
Cairo began accepting Bedouin recruits from Sinai. Additionally, the police and 
security chiefs in Sinai mostly consist of people from mainland Egypt. Consequently, 
many Sinai residents say they feel the presence of the military and the police as an 
occupation similar to the Israeli occupation between 1967 and 1982.190 Bedouin 
activists complain that although the north Sinai base of the MFO is one of the 
province’s largest employers, they avoid the hire of Bedouin for managerial 
positions.191  
The Mubarak regime’s declared intention to “Egyptianize” the region; “not 
only in economic and demographic terms but also, symbolically, in cultural and 
identity terms” has not helped to alleviate the tension between the government and 
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the local populations.192 As Kymlicka has pointed out, minorities are often in conflict 
with majorities over schooling curriculum, as this often leads to conflict between 
regional culture and national history. This is also the case in Sinai, were non-
Bedouin generally teach history “with a perspective in which the Pharaonic heritage 
is officially assumed as being constitutive of the Egyptian nation”. 193  At the 
beginning of the 1990s, a group in al-Arish, in northern Sinai, mobilized to create a 
Bedouin Heritage Museum to house a documentation and research centre on Bedouin 
culture. The museum revived an interest in the Bedouin heritage, and launched 
different projects to develop and promote regional Bedouin crafts (mainly 
embroidery and carpets). It had the support of several donors (notably Swiss and 
Dutch). In 2003, the Supreme Council of Antiquities (SCA) and the governor of 
North Sinai decided to create another museum, in the same town as the Bedouins 
museum was located, sponsored by the Egyptian government with a budget of 47 
million Egyptian pounds. In al-Arish cultural activities are in short supplies and so 
the project would have been an interesting initiative. However, the new museum did 
not include a “local arts and traditional crafts” section, and displayed only 
Nabathaean, Semitic and Pharaonic antiques. Furthermore, it threatened closure of 
the Bedouin Heritage Museum and its research centre. 194 The ICG report stated, 
“The fate of this museum exemplifies the implementation of a centralist, 
authoritarian vision of the Egyptian government that generally ignores the special 
characteristics of its provinces.”195 This is also an example of not providing a 
minority with founding’s so they could preserve certain practices associated with the 
group, and thus not providing them with polyethnic rights.  
Another issue the Bedouins are raising is the central Cairo government’s 
interference in determining Bedouin parliamentary representatives and even local 
shaykhs (tribal leaders).196  
 
Egypt’s authorities further perceived tribal loyalties as a threat to national ones. Attempting to 
subvert these, governors prevented Sinai’s tribes from electing their own mukhtars, or chiefs, 
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and appointed them instead. They further sought to fracture large tribal structures into small 
social units by appointing tribal chiefs in hundreds of Bedouin villages.197 
 
After the revolution of 2011, some Bedouins have demanded that the government 
recognise urf (custom) rulings.198 Today there exists at least six “Sharia committees” 
currently operating in North Sinai, each staffed by around five tribal leaders known 
as shaykhs. Their activities have intensified dramatically since the revolution, as the 
already dysfunctional state security apparatus struggles to contain rampant 
lawlessness. Most of the shaykhs have no formal legal training. Although operating 
in unexpected places like basements and even daycare centers afterhours, the cases 
they handle are just as serious as those adjudicated by the official justice system.199 
In order to explain these three initial terrorist attacks from 2004-2006, 
Egyptian and international NGOs have focused on the human rights violations, 
which have been prominent in police procedures in Sinai. The ICG report argues that 
the reason for why the TWJ carried out the three bombings in Sinai from 2004 to 
2006 was not primarily their radical Islamic ideology, but a more parochial grievance 
towards the Egyptian nation state.200 Some argue that the Sharm al-Shaykh attack 
was directed specifically at President Mubarak, “given the resort’s role as the main 
venue for summit conferences and the president’s frequent personal use of it” in 
revenge for the regime’s neglect and suppression of the people of Sinai.201 Because 
of the emergency law in Egypt, the State Security Investigation service (SSI) and the 
local polices’ power were extended, providing them with similar rights to those of 
the military. Following the investigation of the Taba attack, the SSI arrested over 
three thousand persons, including several hundred persons detained solely to secure 
the surrender of wanted family members. They detained persons without informing 
them of the reasons for their detention, usually picked up in their homes. Human 
Rights Watch interviewed several former detainees who provided credible accounts 
of torture they underwent at the hands of SSI interrogators.202  
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Concerning the frequent kidnappings of foreign tourists, these incidents are 
often seen as a direct response to the treatment of the Bedouins following the Taba 
attack. The victims of the kidnappings are often used to push for the release of 
tribesmen from jail, sometimes in addition to claiming ransom.203 Most of the time 
the tourists are treated well and released unharmed, able to describe their 
abductors.204 The radicalization of Sinai was treated only as a security issue by the 
Mubarak regime, without considering, at least not doing anything, about the difficult 
economical situation of the native population in the peninsula.  
The Chatham House report indicates that many Bedouins have been forced into 
an illegitimate industry:  
 
Excluded from key formal economic sectors, such as tourism or authorized land-cultivation, 
the indigenous population gravitated towards unlicensed tourism services, cannabis and opium 
cultivation, arms-running and smuggling, both into Israel and to Gaza.205 
 
After Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, the volume of illegal trade and arms 
smuggling rose to new heights, escalating further after Hamas took over Gaza in 
2007 and Egypt and Israel closed the borders. All of this brought unprecedented 
prosperity to many Bedouins.206 The growth of supply routes via tunnels between 
Gaza and Sinai led to common interests between Bedouin traders, transporters and 
tunnel owners and Gaza’s consumers. By 2009, the smuggling to Gaza had become 
Sinai’s chief economic revenue and in 2010, Sinai had replaced Israel as Gaza’s 
prime portal for food, fuel and other essentials. 207 Gaza’s trade tie to Sinai was 
rooted in ideology and kinship as well as economic necessity. Also an informal trade 
with Israel has helped to boost the economy. The Bedouins are trading drugs 
cultivated in Sinai, and also foreign workers and prostitutes form primarily Eastern 
Europe and also, more recently from the Horn of Africa. There have also been 
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reports that Bedouins the last couple of years have expanded their business into 
harvesting human organs to be sold abroad.208  
According to Yaari, the smuggling to Gaza has been allowed to proceed 
without interruption during the reign of Mubarak stating, “The weekly closures of 
two or three tunnels have not impaired the scope of illegal trade”.209 Israeli military 
officers cited “insufficient human intelligence; suspected bribery, especially among 
low-level soldiers, and lack of political will”.210 However, in 2011, Egypt began 
sealing a series of smugglers’ tunnels and since the beginning of August 2012, the 
Egyptian army has increased its deployment along its border. Following the military 
coup, the Egyptian army has destroyed many of the tunnels, however, without 
offering any alternative economy. Additionally, Israel’s new defensive measure 
completed in January 2013; the construction of a 240-kilometer double fence along 
the border to Sinai is also destroying a vital informal industry for many Bedouins.211 
These actions my have promoted the Bedouins to escalate their violent activities in 
order to salvage their income.212  
3.2 The Emergence of a New Radical Ideology 
An explanation prevalent in the media is that the radicalization of Sinai is caused by 
the infiltration of foreign groups that seek shelter in Sinai because of its favourable 
geography and lack of government security, some even claimed that core al-Qaida 
has infiltrated Sinai. This explanation stems from the theories surrounding the first 
three terrorist attacks in the peninsula. Initially, it was assumed that Israeli tourists 
were the main targets of the attacks in 2004-2006 and therefore, these attacks were 
partly attributed to al-Qaida.213 In an audiotape, released on March 4, 2004, the al-
Qaida leader, al-Zawahiri, called for attacks on “Israel and the American 
crusaders”.214 Later this theory was dismissed owing to reports from the initial 
investigation asserting there had not turned up any evidence of the perpetrators 
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having received training in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Nor were there any clear 
indications of logistic activities on behalf of the cell in Muslim communities in 
Europe, nor any outside financing and no direct ties to al-Qaida or its former leader, 
Osama bin-Laden.215 However, this explanation is still very much intact. Scholars 
have claimed that the sophistication and deadliness of some of the attacks in Sinai “at 
least hints at some degree of foreign assistance.”216 The Egyptian government’s 
downplay of any foreign dimension involved is explained as natural because 
acknowledging the presence of the notorious al-Qaida would potentially cause a 
crisis in their tourist economy if acknowledging the presence of the notorious al-
Qaida.217 Also the names of the new groups claiming to be carrying out different 
terrorist attacks may indicate an al-Qaida presence.218  
On the other hand, core al-Qaida has not publically sanctioned any of the Sinai 
groups as officially branches of the movement. Most of the different groups that have 
claimed responsibility for attacks in the area during the last decade appear to 
originate in Sinai. They all seem to be newly established groups, apparently 
consisting of smaller units or cells, far less organized and structured than prior 
groups in Egypt like the JI. 
The Washington Institute article states that Salafi doctrines were imported to 
Sinai in the 1980s by Bedouin students returning from universities in the Egyptian 
Delta, especially from Zaqaziq, as well as tribesmen who had spend years working in 
Saudi Arabia. Zaqaziq is known as a local stronghold of Islamist radicals. The new 
Salafi associations were initially based in north Sinai in addition to a few smaller 
villages in the central region. Clashes between groups adhering to the new Salafi 
doctrines and groups belonging to previously established Sufi orders in the 1990s, 
led to splits within tribal and family units eroding the traditional hierarchy. 
Moreover, the large-scale smuggling networks further eroded the traditional 
hierarchy, transferring actual authority from tribal elders to Islamists and gang 
leaders. The article claims that the relatively recent emergence of radical Islamist 
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groups in the peninsula is an unprecedented development that departs from 
longstanding Bedouin traditions that challenges tribal hierarchy.219  
What however is clear when analysing the targets of attack and statements 
from groups claiming to be responsible, is that the perpetrators definitely share the 
al-Qaida ideology. Al-Zawahiri has praised many of the attacks in Sinai, especially 
the bombing of the pipeline to Israel and during the last decade. Moreover, both 
Christians and Sufis in Sinai have been targeted. There have been examples of 
Egyptian Christians moving from their hometowns in Sinai, in fear of their life after 
receiving threats from radical Islamists. Some supposedly see the Christians as an 
obstacle for implementing what they define as a sharia state.220 Also a Sufi shrine in 
Shaykh Zuwayid has repeatedly been attacked, until it was destroyed in 2012. Some 
radical Islamists believe that Sufi shrines are a form of idolatry, and this may have 
prompted some Salafis to attack the shrine.221 
Israeli scholars, and especially Israeli media, have claimed that Hamas has 
infiltrated Sinai and is using the area to exercise proxy warfare. Some stress that 
Egyptian-born Palestinians and Palestinians coming from Gaza are responsible for 
several attacks, underlining that they probably are cooperating with the local 
Bedouins. In this case, the chief motive is the anti-Israel ideology prevalent among 
many Palestinians and Bedouins. Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian organisations 
are accused of having run various clandestine activities in Sinai, especially in the 
Rafah and al-Arish area, since the beginning in the 1990s.222 The long history 
between Gaza and Sinai of commercial exchanges, tribal and family structures and 
military administration (Egypt from 1949 to 1967, Israel from 1967 to 1982) build 
strong solidarity networks across the border.223 Up to a third of Gaza’s population 
has Bedouin roots, and Gaza born persons of Bedouin origin rank prominently in the 
Hamas leadership. “Ethnically, historically and linguistically, the indigenous 
Bedouin population has closer ties to the lands to its east than to its west,” Pelham 
states in an article from 2012, where he include a statement from a Bedouin tribal 
leader situated in the north of Sinai saying: “Our language and our traditions are the 
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same as Gaza’s. We’re 40 kilometres from Rafah, and 200 kilometres from 
Cairo.”224  Many of the tribes in Sinai have relatives living in Gaza and Israel. The 
strong Palestinian presence, especially in the border towns like al-Arish and Rafah, 
reinforces links to the northeast. The ICG report maintains that a comprehensive and 
lasting resolution of the Sinai question can only be achieved in the context of a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
There is good reason to believe that many of the attacks in Sinai are linked to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, not necessarily the work of a Palestinian 
faction. This has been a valid argument ever since a member of TWJ, Muhammad 
Abdullah Abu Garir, stated in his confession after the Taba bombing, that the 
objective was “to kill Israelis and Americans in revenge for Palestinian victims of the 
intifada (uprising). It was not the intention to harm other Muslims.”225 However, it is 
not surprising that Garir denied that TWJ deliberately targeted Egyptians. After all, 
he was tried in an Egyptian court. Nevertheless, this leaves unexplained why 
Egyptians were the majority of the casualties in all three attacks in 2004, 2005 and 
2006.226 
3.3 Reinforcing Factor: The Egyptian Revolution 2011 
From 2011 and onwards, several factors, directly or indirectly connected to the Arab 
Spring, have contributed further in making Sinai a “terrorist haven”. In the first 
months of the revolution, military personnel in Sinai was redirected to Cairo and 
other cities in an effort to control the situation there, while Sinai was left 
unprotected. Concurrently, the Bedouins overpowered the government forces and 
established in its absence a Bedouin self-rule spread across the peninsula. The Sinai 
tribes established  
 
their own security committees to police the peninsula, legal committees (lijan al-islah) to 
adjudicate local disputes – based on a combination of tribal practice and Islamic law – and 
economic committees to raise revenues by taxing proceeds from smuggling and operating a 
rudimentary tax regime-cum-protection racket.227  
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The TKWJ- group announced in the summer of 2011, the establishment of an Islamic 
state of Sinai. Mixing jihadi with local separatist rhetoric, they distributed leaflets 
declared an Islamic emirate in Sinai and ordained the implementation of Sharia law. 
Also the opening of the Gaza border from May to August 2012 may have 
resulted in a growing number of terrorist networks affiliating with Palestinian 
organizations like the AI, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular 
Resistance Committees (PRC) infiltrating Sinai and attacking Israel from the 
peninsula.228 
In a massive series of prison breakouts in January 2011, many radical 
Islamists, among them people accused of being responsible for the Sinai bombing in 
2004-2006, managed to escape. Some of them retuned to Sinai, probably even more 
radicalized after years in Egyptian prisons. This may also have affected the security 
situation in Sinai.229  
 
Explaining the radicalization of Sinai 
In this chapter, I have presented different explanations as to why Sinai is 
radicalizing. In the first explanation, the researchers identify the local population, 
predominantly the Bedouins, as the perpetrators of most of the attacks occurring in 
Sinai. The neglect of Sinai and the discrimination and suppression of its inhabitants 
by the Mubarak regime, are underlined as important factors for the radicalization. 
Attacks that could fit this explanation are the repeated attacks targeting Egyptian 
military and security, boarder guards (Israeli and Egyptian) and the MFO (as they are 
hindering the smuggling), and also, to a certain degree attacks that targets tourists 
and the repeated bombing of the pipeline as these attacks damage the governments 
most important source of income. However, it does not explain the attacks that are 
targeting Christians and Sufis in Sinai, or the attacks directly targeting Israel. 
In the second explanation, researches states that there has been an incremental 
increase of radical groups in Sinai since the 80s, and there are a growing number of 
al-Qaida -affiliated or inspired, terrorists groups in Sinai. Here the ethnicity or 
national belonging of the perpetrators is not the main focus, as all perpetrators are 
described as “radical Islamists”. Nonetheless, the perpetrators of most of the attacks 
occurring in Sinai are identified as a mix between the local Bedouins, Egyptian born 
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Palestinians, Hamas members, other Palestinians situated in Gaza, Egyptians from 
other parts of Egypt and jihadists coming from other countries. In this explanation, 
the motive behind these attacks could be the radical ideology in itself, or it could be 
motivated by the unfair treatment by the Mubarak regime and justified by a “radical 
Islamist ideology”. Attacks that could fit this explanation are the repeated attacks on 
Sufis, Christians, Israeli military, civilians (tourists) and infrastructure, the MFO (as 
they are considered an extension of U.S. forces), and to a certain degree the repeated 
bombing of the pipeline as these attacks halted the supply of gas to Israel.  
The third explanation seeks to explain why the situation deteriorated after the 
revolution, underlining the security vacuum that occurred with the ouster of 
Mubarak. It is interesting to conclude, because it clearly shows separatist tendencies 
among the Bedouins.  
I will underline that none of the explanations are mutually exclusive. However, 
there are two underlying notions/ assumptions. The first is that the Bedouins 
essentially want to be recognized as “true” Egyptian citizens and to be included in 
the Egyptian nation state, however without being discriminated. This is expressed by 
emphasizing Bedouin statements where they demand citizenship, landownership 
rights and their will to be subscribed in the military. The second assumption is that 
the Bedouins, especially those inside radical Islamists groups, will not, and therefore 
cannot, be re-integrated into the nation state. This is expressed by highlighting for 
instance the Islamist groups’ view of the government as infidel, and the groups’ 
efforts to establish an Islamic state in Sinai. Of course, both of these notions are in a 
way “true”, and my intention with this section is not to answer what is the most 
prevalent notion among the Bedouins, but to make the reader aware of these different 
notions before we turn to look at the FJP’s view on the situation in Sinai. 
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4 Freedom and Justice Party’s view on Sinai 
I believe that Bedouins want to feel as real Egyptians. 
- Nussiba Ashraf 
 
All of my sources in the FJP told me the situation in the entire Egypt was difficult, 
while the situation in Sinai was described as “out of control”. My interviewees 
underlined that the FJP, as a political party, was obligated and prepared to prioritize 
the situation in the peninsula.  
In this chapter I will present my sources’ view on who they believe are the 
perpetrators behind the attacks in Sinai from 2004 until 2012, and why they believe 
that Sinai is radicalizing. My informants’ answers on these questions will make it 
easier to analyse and understand the FJP’s plan of action, their policy. It is also 
interesting to examine in what degree the FJP’s perception of the situation in Sinai 
corresponds with the explanations given by the ICG, the Chatham House and the 
Washington Institute, presented in the previous chapter. 
4.1 Who Are the Perpetrators and What Are Their Motives? 
During the past decade Sinai has increasingly radicalized. As described in previous 
chapters, there have been many forms of attacks that have targeted Egyptian soldiers, 
police and civilians, in addition to Israeli military and civilians. Foreign tourists have 
been abducted and the MFO headquarter has been surrounded and international 
observational forces been held hostages. Furthermore, MFO vehicles have several 
times been hit by improvised explosive devices (IED) and local Sufis shrines and 
Christian churches have been hit by rockets and been fired on.  
It is important to underline that many of my sources stressed the absence of 
reliable data concerning the identities of the perpetrators. Nussiba Ashraf, who at the 
time of my fieldwork was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and was 
heading the Research Team, said, “These groups are not well known. […] Because 
the government’s security was not extended to these places, we don’t know a lot.”230 
Nevertheless, all of my sources answered my questions, and all of them had an idea 
of who might be behind the various attacks and what might be the perpetrators 
motivation. 
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4.1.1 “The People in Sinai Resent the Regime” 
The first person I interviewed was Abdelrahman Ayyash, a previous member of the 
MB and currently working as a researcher for the ICG. One of the first things he told 
me, was that it was “absolutely obvious” that the perpetrators of the various attacks 
in Sinai are Egyptians. I asked him if he was talking about Bedouin Egyptians or 
Egyptians from mainland Egypt, and he replied: “From what I saw, all of them were 
Bedouins. When people talked to me they confirmed that all of the jihadists were 
from different tribes.”231  
Hilmi al-Gazzar, who at the time we spoke, was a senior leader of the MB and 
was the leader of the FJP in the district of Giza, stated that “the angry people of 
Sinai” were the ones that executed most of the attacks in Sinai.232 When I asked al-
Gazzar why “the people of Sinai” are acting this way, he said that “the current 
situation in Sinai is a result of many decades of neglect”, adding that “the former 
regime didn’t care about an actual development in Sinai, and that resulted in 
resentment that turned the people into rebels”.233 Al-Gazzar later described “the 
people of Sinai” as Bedouins.  
Similarly, Dr. Murad Ali, at that time the FJP’s media advisor, underlined that 
the situation was a result of “accumulations of bad management for more than thirty 
years and the previous regime handling Sinai poorly” adding this had created a gap 
between the Bedouins and other Egyptians.234 Amr Arfan, who was the FJP’s 
assistant secretary in the area of Mokattam and the head of the Political 
Communication Secretariat, told me that he frequently visited Sinai, and not just the 
tourist places in the South, but travelled to al-Arish and other places in the North. 
Arfan said:  
 
In any place in the world, where its people suffers from marginalization, poverty and 
unemployment, where the people don’t have job opportunities and there is no development, all 
these factors create a fertile environment for many problems that could exist in a society.235 
                                                
231 Abdelrahman Ayyash, Works as a researcher in the ICG, prior MB member, Interview by author, 
Cairo, October 2012. 
232 Hilmi al-Gazzar, FJP leader in the district of Giza, senior leader of the MB, member of the MB’s 
shura council, Interview by author [in Arabic], Cairo, October 2012.[Interview in Arabic, translated 
by author]  
233 Ibid. 
234 Murad Ali, FJP’s media advisor, Interview by author, Cairo, October 2012. 
235 Amr Arfan, FJP’s assistant secretary in the area of Mokattam and the head of the Political 
Communication Secretariat, Interview by author [in Arabic], Mokattam, November 2012.[Interview in 
Arabic, translated by author]  
 52 
 
Arfan told me that this was the case in Sinai, and that the bad condition for the 
“people of Sinai” had forced many into the “black marked”. The three above-
mentioned sources, in addition to Alaʾ Sayyid, who was the leader of the FJP in the 
area of Mokattam, told me about the Bedouins’ illegal activities, the smuggling of 
drugs and weapons, and in some cases humans, over the boarder to Israel and Gaza. 
However, what I found interesting was my interviewees’ eagerness to explain why 
the Bedouins were pursuing these illegal activities. These sources explained that 
when the local police interfered with the Bedouins’ new economy, the people 
perceived this as unjust, because they considered the smuggling their only 
opportunity to earn an income. My informants then underlined that there are no other 
legitimate ways of earning money in Sinai because of the lack of development, and 
all of them told me that they understood the Bedouins’ behaviour and viewed it as 
natural236, given the situation.237 Nussiba Ashraf pointed out: “If I don’t have a job, 
what can I do? I would search for one, so I start down that path- the same as what 
Somali pirates used to do.”238 My interviewees also stated that this kind of illegal 
activities could lead to terrorism if they believed that their source of income was in 
any way threatened. When I asked my sources in the FJP why they believed people 
turned to violence, all seven of them declared that poverty was one of the main 
reasons. 
When I asked Ammar Fayad, an active member of FJP who works for the 
Ikhwan Web, the MB official English-language web page, directly whom he thought 
was behind the three attacks from 2004-2006, he said that although the actual 
perpetrators were radical Islamists, consisting of mostly Bedouins, they became this 
way after being mistreated by the government, and especially after the rough 
treatment during the initial investigation of the Taba attack:  
 
The police made a big mistake when they dealt with this situation. They dealt with this 
situation without any humanity towards the people in Sinai. Therefore the people in Sinai 
resent the regime, and they still do. Most of those arrested at that time were Egyptians, of 
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course the police told us that someone were from Palestine, some from Jordan, but most of 
them were Egyptian.239  
 
When I asked him what he meant by “the people of Sinai” and “Egyptians”, he told 
me that he was referring to the Bedouins. Hilmi al-Gazzar supported this explanation 
saying: “I believe that the Sinai people are behind it. The police were mistreating 
them in the past, and it is still happening. This has caused great resentment and 
resulted in attacks on the police.”240 Also the remaining five of my informants in the 
FJP said that extensive use of government lead violence against the Bedouins had 
resulted in counter violence that had only escalated the situation instead of solving it. 
Concerning the frequent kidnappings of foreign tourists, all my sources agreed 
that various Bedouin tribes were the perpetrators of these attacks. The FJP’s view 
here is not surprising, as the victims are often used to push for the release of 
tribesmen from jail, sometimes in addition to claiming ransom.241 Most of the time 
the tourists are treated well and released unharmed, able to describe their 
abductors.242 Fayad explained that some Bedouins had been unjustly jailed after the 
Taba attack, and Bedouins used the abductions of tourists, as a way of negotiation 
with the government because the tribes regarded this, as the only thing the 
government would respond to.243  
All of my sources, among them Nussiba Ashraf, emphasized that the Bedouins 
had countless reasons to be angry at the previous regime, mentioning the 
government’s neglect of Sinai that had lead to poverty and lack of opportunities for 
the Bedouins and the police violence against the native population in Sinai.244 She 
later in the interview emphasized that the current situation was also the result of a 
deliberate divide and conquer policy lead by the Mubarak regime.  
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To neglect a part of your land and not trust its people, that was the main fault of the Mubarak 
regime. They neglected the land altogether and they were sending a clear message to its 
people: We do not trust you.245 
 
Walid al-Haddad is a senior member of the MB and a founding member of the FJP, 
and at the time of the interview the second in command in FJP’s Foreign 
Relationship Committee. He supported Nussiba’s view that the reason why Bedouins 
were rebelling was partly due to the deliberate oppression, and especially the 
execution, of Bedouins by the previous regime.246 Amr Fayad highlighted that the 
Bedouins did not have the freedom to participate in politics, and they were not 
included in the political processes and this might have caused them to use violence. 
Nussiba Ashraf likewise stated that “if your country is excluding you from all the 
ways of participating, the usage of violence may be a political language. This is not 
to say that violence is right, but we can understand it.”247  
Alaʾ Sayyid also underlined the landownership issue as a motive and an 
explanation as to why “the people of Sinai” are resorting to the use of violence and 
underlined that the law “also prevents your children from inheriting property.”248 
Likewise, Ali, Ashraf and al-Haddad, also declared the problem with landownership 
for Bedouins as an important issue that needed to be solved in order to halt the 
radicalization.249 Murad Ali also stated: “It is very well known that democracy is 
minimizing terrorism, because when people are exchanging their ideas you are 
treating the misunderstandings.”250 Al-Gazzar supported this view, saying: 
 
During the old regime, there were ideas that never came into the light because of the 
oppression, […] but when we start to discuss those ideas and listen to them in public, […] then 
people will shift from practical jihad to democratic jihad.251 
 
Likewise, Amr Arfan stated that one of the reasons why the radicalization occurred 
was the exclusion of the Bedouins from political institutions and from the police, the 
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army and the Egyptian intelligence service.252 Many of my sources clearly stated that 
the Bedouins felt alienated from the Egyptian society because they had not been 
included. Murad Ali presented me with an example: 
 
In for example in Canada or Australia, when you have immigrants you are allowing them to 
own land and you are trying to incorporate them into your community to be a part of the 
community, and they were keen to let them dress the same dress, to talk the same language, to 
include their kids into your schools, to allow them to go for governmental jobs, to feel I am 
now a Canadian, or I am now an Australian, to feel loyal to this new country. Unfortunately, 
we were doing the opposite to our people in Sinai. They were not able to go join the police or 
the army.253    
 
Seven out of my seven sources in the FJP underlined the lack of political rights and 
oppression as a reason for why some people turn to the use of violence.  
I asked my interviewees if they believed that the Bedouins were radicalizing 
because they sought to gain any special rights, applying only for the Bedouins. 
Nussiba Ashraf answered: “I believe that Bedouins want to feel as real Egyptians.”254 
I said that while most Egyptians are taught that they decent from the Pharaohs, the 
Bedouins are taught that they descend in a straight lineage from the Prophet 
Muhammad himself.255 I then asked if Ashraf believed that the Bedouins perhaps 
want to be different, she replied:  
 
I don’t think so. I don’t think they have any ambitions to emphasize their different origins, 
because the Egyptians are also very much related to the Arab. The Arab affiliations are very 
important to the Egyptian people, so I don’t think there are any contradictions in having a 
Pharaonic heritance and descend from the Prophet. So I think that the real problem of the 
Bedouins is that they would like to feel like they are Egyptians with equal rights like other 
Egyptians. This is the main problem.256  
 
Nussiba Ashraf told me that she did not want to categorize them “as Bedouins, or 
people living in Upper Egypt, people living in Cairo and so on,” underlining that “all 
Egyptians are equal.”257 When I asked her why the Copts are mentioned in a separate 
section in the FJP’s program, but not the Bedouins, she replied: “The reasons why 
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we mention Christians in our program are that this issue of ‘how will the FJP deal 
with the rights of the Christians’ has been raised before.” 258 She explained that the 
FJP needed to assure the Christians that they would not be discriminated against. 
Nussiba continued by saying: “But actually the Egyptian people are very 
homogeneous. When you walk in the street you can’t differentiate between a 
Christian and a Muslim.”259 Also Alaʾ Sayyid was eager to stress that the FJP does 
not view the Bedouins as a “special group” in Egypt:  
 
The Bedouins are not a minority, and they are not terrorists. They are just like other groups in 
Egypt. Of course there are some terrorists that are Bedouins, like there are some terrorists from 
Upper Egypt.260  
 
Murad Ali added, “they are not a minority, they are Egyptians.” 261 Walid al-Haddad 
told me that the Mubarak regime had deliberately caused what he described as “the 
sectarianism in Egypt”, telling the Egyptian people that some groups are different. 
Al-Haddad referred to the 2011 revolution and said: “But now, after the Tahrir-
square, you couldn’t separate between Christians and Muslims, or Bedouin or Upper 
Egyptian people, we are all one hand.”262 Even the president was careful to use the 
word “minority”. An example is Mursi’s following statement: “Christians in Egypt 
are partners in this homeland, not a minority. They have the full right in their state, 
because they are an important component of this nation.”263 The only one of my 
sources that actually told me the Bedouins have a distinct culture was Amr Arfan, 
saying “the Sinai’s people, they have good customs and traditions, and very good 
characters.” He continued to describe their culture as noble and generous adding that 
the Bedouin customs and traditions are different from Cairo and Alexandria. Arfan 
said that in order to “solve a problem in a society one needs to find solutions that fit 
with the society itself. We can’t solve their problems in the same way we solve 
Cairo-people’s problems because that wouldn’t suit them.”264 The words “minority” 
or “Bedouin” are also absent in the FJP program. Only Amr Arfan and the two 
journalists I interviewed pointed out that the Bedouins have another culture and 
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heritage than the dominant Egyptian culture. However, not even Arfan labelled the 
Bedouins as a minority. 
4.1.2 “Al-Qaida? I Don’t Think so. We Can Call Them Islamic Jihadists.” 
When I interviewed Lina Attalah, the editor of Egyptian Independent, she told me 
that it was possible to separate between two kinds of violence in Sinai. Regarding the 
frequent kidnappings, blocking of international roads and attacks on police stations 
she said:  
 
These are then people who are not high profiled terrorists, they are not al-Qaida, they are no 
one, they are just people of the area who are not being heard and don’t have proper mediators 
to the government… Because there are no proper mediations in Sinai, and those guys are 
resorting to extreme acts of lawlessness, […] and that is an expression of anger.265  
 
Attalah went on to state that “there is also another layer of action, as we all know, 
that is manifested in like a higher scale of violence, such as the killing of 16 soldiers, 
such as the constant pipeline explosions.” 266 Attalah added that these actions could 
demand “some higher level of organisation”, although she did not mentioning al-
Qaida.267 
Usually, when I asked my sources to describe the identity of the perpetrators of 
the different attacks in Sinai, my sources described them as “radical Islamists”. I 
further asked about the identity of these “radical Islamists” and my sources said they 
consisted of mostly “the people of Sinai” or “Egyptians”. When I asked who “the 
people of Sinai” were, and what origin these “Egyptians” had, it finally became clear 
that my sources were in fact referring to the Bedouins. Ammar Fayad also describes 
the perpetrators in this way. He told me that he believed that the majority are 
Bedouins, initially saying “the people of Sinai”, but added that also Palestinians may 
be involved. Regarding the Palestinians, Fayad explained that some Palestinians have 
lived in Sinai for generations, but do not have Egyptian citizenship, and others are 
perhaps coming through the tunnels from Gaza. However, Fayad also declared that 
the increasing violence in Sinai is “not a problem between the state and the 
Bedouins, no, it is a problem between the state and radical Islamist movements”.268 
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Fayad added that most Bedouins are not radicals, and members of the radical groups 
might also come from outside Egypt. “The borders of Sinai are open, so anything can 
happen”, he said. 269  Walid al-Haddad supported this view, affirming that the 
investigation of the attack on August 5, 2012 “had given answers that just gave more 
questions.”270Al-Haddad said that following the investigations it had become clear 
that there were no Egyptians that executed that terrorist attack.271 
I asked my sources if they believed, as the media often state, that al-Qaida is 
involved in the radicalization. Nussiba Ashraf rejected the idea altogether:  
 
Al-Qaida? I don’t think so. This is the result of neglect. There are some extreme groups, and 
they are of course not the main groups of Sinai, we can call them Islamic jihadists, but I don’t 
think they have any relations with al-Qaida.272  
 
Ammar Fayad stated, “They may be reading the ethics of al-Qaida, or other Islamist 
theories from Ayman Zawahiri and believe in it”. However, he emphasized that he 
did not believe the Islamists in Sinai had a personal connection with al-Qaida.273 
When I asked Fayad what he though might be the motivation behind these attacks, he 
said: 
 
They don’t agree on any relations with Israel of course. Look, most of Egyptians refuse peace 
with Israel, but they don’t say that we should fight Israel, we don’t need to fight and we don’t 
need to have the peace agreement. Of course the Islamist movement refuse any relations with 
Israel, so for the perpetrators it is logic to attack the gas line and other things.274  
 
Like many of my sources, Fayad believed that radical Islamists were the perpetrators 
because of the many attacks targeting Israel, referring to the al-Qaida ideology’s 
outspoken hatred towards Israel. I argued that many of the attacks have been directed 
at Egyptian facilities, and not actually directly at Israel, and he replied: 
 
Some groups are only interested in the Palestinian situation and only think about how they can 
fight Israel, but some movements also think that the Egyptian government, by dealing with the 
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Israeli government, becomes a legitimate target. […] They believe in an al-Qaida ethics, and 
al-Qaida of course called all the governments of Arab counties kufar [non-believers].275  
 
Alaʾ Sayyid and Murad Ali also stated that some groups might be inspired by the al-
Qaida ideology, but did not believe that these groups received any fighters, funds or 
instructions from the core al-Qaida group, led by al-Zawahiri. Hilmi al-Gazzar and 
Amr Arfan did not mention al-Qaida at all. Fayad and al-Haddad added that although 
these radical Islamist groups might consist of some “foreign fighters”, they are 
working together with local groups consisting of Bedouins and local Palestinians.  
Ammar Fayad and Alaʾ Sayyid stated that the current situation in Sinai is a 
result of a global radical movement that started around a decade ago. The reason why 
this movement got foothold in Sinai is accordingly due to the Camp David 
agreement’s restrictions on security, in a combination with Sinai’s rough topography, 
which made the Peninsula a fruitful place for terrorists to hide. Sayyid said: “There 
are two reasons why Sinai is a good place to be a terrorist: the geography and the fact 
that there is no control.” 276 
 
I want you to understand that since the Camp David agreement, Sinai has been out of control. 
If anything happens, the regime has no opportunity to stop it or control the area. For this reason 
many of the terrorists from Upper Egypt went to Sinai. This is a good place to be, because 
there is no control there.277 
 
Walid al-Haddad also stressed, “Sinai is a very good platform for terrorism. There is 
no life there, it is only desert and it’s very close to Israel, so it’s an operation room 
for any terrorist group”.278 My interviewees described Sinai, and especially the 
North, as a lawless state, a “Wild West”, ideal for outlaws to hide and radical 
Islamists to recruit new members and execute attacks without interference.  
When I asked Alaʾ Sayyid why he believed that people become radical 
Islamists he emphasized “poor education” and “few other public services”.279 He 
underlined that especially young people with no education might accept radical ideas 
because they have no other knowledge of “what true Islam is really about”.280 
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Ammar Fayad said that “the absence of right knowledge of Islam and the weakness 
of education in Egypt play a big role” regarding the appearance of terrorism and the 
use of violence in the name of Islam. Alaʾ Sayyid, Walid al-Haddad, Amr Arfan, 
Murad Ali, Nussiba Ashraf and Hilmi al-Gazzar, explicitly said that the lack of 
proper education was a factor that could lead a person to believe in the “wrong 
Islam” and make him or her become a radical Islamist.281 
4.1.3 “Hamas Doesn’t Desire any Disturbance in the Sinai Peninsula” 
In international and Egyptian media, both Hamas and al-Qaida have been blamed for 
executing various attacks in Sinai. Ayyash stated that “perhaps there were relations, 
but not organisational relations, I mean Hamas are not leading, but they probably 
have good relations with some brigades, like Qassam-brigades or something.”282 
When I asked al-Haddad what he thought about the rumours that Hamas or other 
groups are using Sinai as a launching pad against Israel and referred to the two cross-
boarder attacks in April and August of 2010, when rockets were launched from Sinai 
and landed in Israel and Jordan. He replied sharply: “There are no rockets from 
Sinai,” and added that the FJP and most Egyptians are very keen to have stability and 
security between its neighbours. Yet, underlining that: “We are with the right of the 
people in Palestine, and we are condemning what happened from Israel towards the 
Palestinian people.”283 Ammar Fayad also denied any involvement of Hamas: 
 
No, not even during the period of the Mubarak regime. There was no involvement of the 
Hamas even when it was clear that Mubarak had good relations with Israel. When it comes to 
for example the gas pipe-explosions, anyone can do this. This is happening in the desert 
without any police and security force, so anyone can do this.284  
 
Hilmi al-Gazzar replied that he did not think Hamas are executing any of the attacks, 
adding that Hamas is “very busy with the situation in Gaza” and that Hamas leaders 
declared that they “don’t desire any disturbance in the Sinai Peninsula”.285  
Although my sources denied any involvement of Hamas in the radicalization of 
Sinai, they did not all deny the involvement of Palestinians. Ammar Fayad said:  
 
                                                
281 Arfan; Ali; Ashraf; al-Gazzar. 
282 Ayyash. 
283 al-Haddad. 
284 Fayad. 
285 al-Gazzar. 
 61 
Of course, the situation in Gaza is also an important factor in this situation. After Hamas won 
the election in Gaza in 2006, some Islamist groups in Gaza refused the political process and 
rejected Hamas, as it now had become a political party and therefore refused violent jihad. So 
they went in opposition to Hamas.286   
 
Fayad said that one of the groups is known as the Bayt al-Maqdis. He hastily stated, 
“However, Hamas dealt with these groups effectively, and has shown that it can 
control this movement in Gaza. Most of these groups found a good environment to 
be safe in Sinai and to be far from the hands of Hamas’ security arms.”287  
4.1.4 “We Still Have what we Call Fulul” 
The Sharm al-Shaykh terrorist attack is described as the biggest terrorist incident in 
Egypt’s history. Amr Arfan and Alaʾ Sayyid agreed that that the TWJ executed the 
attack. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the group consisted mostly of Bedouins 
and Egyptian-born Palestinians and claimed responsibility for the attack. However, 
my two interviewees argued that the group might have been infiltrated by Mubarak’s 
men, or at least been instructed by the former Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly, about 
when and where to bomb. They consequently viewed the following attack as Habib 
al-Adly’s fault, because even if he did not directly orchestrate it, the Dahab attack 
was seen as a revenge attack. Accordingly, the regime’s brutal treatment of the Sinai 
population, and the Bedouins in particular, during the investigation following the 
Taba (2004) and Sharm al-Shaykh (2005) attacks is said to have made the Bedouins 
rebel and execute the Dahab attack in 2006 in order to paralyze the lucrative tourist 
industry, and in that way damage the Mubarak regime.  
When I asked who they believed was responsible for the Taba, Sharm al-
Shaykh and Dahab attack, both Amr Arfan and Alaʾ Sayyid answered with a 
question. They both asked me if I had heard about the bombing of a church in 
Alexandria in January 2011? I told them that I had read about it and that about 20 
Christian Copts died as a result of the bombing. They then underlined that this attack 
was also orchestrated by al-Adly. When I asked Amr Arfan how the Interior minister 
would benefit from such attacks, he replied:   
 
This incident was used by the regime as a justification in order to imprison thousands of 
regime opponents. However, during the revolution, someone broke into the state security 
                                                
286 Fayad. 
287 Ibid. 
 62 
forces building and discovered several secret documents. Among these documents was one that 
proved that the bombing was executed on orders given by the former -Interior Minister Habib 
al-Adly, and the purpose of the attack was to broaden the gap between Muslims and Christians. 
The 2004 bombings that happened in Taba, and two more after that, are the exact same thing as 
the Saints’ Church.288 
 
Walid al-Haddad stated that supporters of the Mubarak regime were directly 
involved in the deteriorating situation in Sinai. Al-Haddad told me “many groups are 
working to make problems in Sinai”.289 When I asked him who these people are, he 
said: 
 
We still have what we call fulul, or the supporters of the Mubarak regime. So they want to 
make a detrition in the internal policy of Egypt, not related to the foreign policy and the 
relationship between Egypt and Israel, no, they are focusing on the internal and domestic 
policy of Egypt, and how they can make the situation for the president critical. So they make 
the situation difficult.290  
 
Al-Haddad explained to me that “these people” are working for the return of the old 
regime. In order to do this “they support rebels and make disturbance themselves and 
try to undermine the stability of the area”, stressing that this was not just in Sinai, but 
also in the whole of Egypt. 
4.1.5 “The Israeli Intelligence is Involved, We Can’t Deny that.” 
While my sources mostly blamed the Mubarak regime, indirectly or directly, for the 
Bedouins’ rebellious behaviour, some also blamed Israel for manipulating the 
Bedouins. Amr Arfan stated, “the current situation in Sinai is not only caused by the 
people of Sinai themselves, there is always someone who’s trying to mess with291 
Sinai.”292 I asked him why he believed this, and he replied: 
 
We in the party, members of the interior ministry, among people from the army and from the 
presidential palace, all went to meet with shaykhs of the tribes in Sinai. These shaykhs stated 
that they have no problems with the government, or with the country. […] Someone has a 
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hidden agenda, and is interfering with the situation in Sinai (…) like Mubarak used to, but now 
Mubarak is gone, and therefore they need to find another way of upholding the chaos.293 
 
When I later in the interview asked who might be interested in the deterioration of 
Sinai, he told me that Mossad, the Israeli intelligence, was behind the 
deterioration.294 When I told Arfan that Israeli media clamed there was an increase of 
attacks after the opening of the borders between Egypt and Gaza in the spring of 
2011, insinuating that Hamas was making the situation is Sinai worse, Arfan replied 
that these accusations was part of an Israeli conspiracy-plan:  
 
This is part of a plan. They want the whole world to visualize that if we open borders for our 
brothers in Gaza to lift the blockade on the Gaza strip, then attacks and killing will happen. 
start happening. They are trying to deliver a message that if we open the borders, then Egypt is 
in danger. However, everyone knows that there are tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, so if a 
Palestinian wanted to come to Egypt, it would cost him 200 dollars to cross through the tunnel. 
If someone wanted to execute a terrorist attack it’s already very easy.295  
 
Murad Ali told me that he believed that he thought the majority of the actual 
perpetrators were “the people of Sinai”, however, he also said that “some intelligence 
could infiltrate those groups, pushing them in one direction or another”, later 
indicating that Mossad, Israeli intelligence, might be behind some of the attacks in 
the peninsula. Hilmi al-Gazzar also underlined that most of the perpetrators are the 
people of Sinai, but added: “Also, the Israeli Intelligence is involved, and we can’t 
deny that.”296 Al-Gazzar added: “Israel is working to destabilize the area and to 
create a polarization between the people in the area and the government, previous 
and present”.297 When I asked why Israel would do this, he said that even though 
Egypt and Israel have a peace treaty “Israel is not Egypt’s real friend”.298  
When I asked my interviewees if Israel did not suffer from the radicalization of 
Sinai, the general tone in the interview changed and I was treated like I was 
incredibly naive for even asking this question. They told me that Egypt had and 
always has played a chief role in “the Arab World”, but that Mubarak was corrupt 
and did not use his influence. To give me an example to prove this, Amr Arfan told 
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me that in 2009, when Israel was attacking Gaza “no one did anything”, whilst in 
2012, the attack only lasted for 6-7 days, arguing that this was because of president 
Mursi’s efforts. Arfan did not however, mention that Mursi, who had previously 
refused to talk to Israelis or even pronounce the country’s name, was praised by U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for his role as a mediator between Gaza and Israel 
during the Gaza crisis.299  
I was surprised that three of my sources believed that Mossad was able, and 
had an interest in destabilizing Sinai. I had thought that as the attacks directly 
affected Israel, they would want to keep the area stable. Although the minority of my 
sources believed that Israeli intelligence were directly involved, all of my 
interviewees in the FJP believed that Israel was benefiting from a “weak Sinai”. 
When I asked Ammar Fayad about the situation in Sinai he replied: 
 
The situation in Sinai is a big challenge for Egypt. After the Camp David agreement that came 
after the war of October, the Egyptian regime became weaker in Sinai. I don’t know if there 
was a secret agreement between Mubarak and Benjamin Netanyahu, but the general situation 
was state absence in Sinai resulting in a weak security situation, not under control because of 
the agreement.300  
 
Also Murad Ali shared this view saying when Sinai, which shares border with Israel, 
is destabilizing, that makes Egypt, “from a national security point of view”, unable to 
stand against Israel. “We are not talking about war, but we are talking about strength 
in political relations”.301 During my interviews, I understood that my sources viewed 
the Camp David Accords as a key reason as to why Sinai is radicalizing. They 
explained that the Egyptian military are under the Camp David prevented from 
introducing more than light weapons into Area B, just east of al-Arish, and limited to 
a police force in Area C, next to the border. Consequently, after the 2011 revolution, 
Egyptian soldiers found themselves rapidly outgunned by local forces. Because 
Israel was stressing the importance of continuing the treaty, then according to my 
sources, Israel must want Sinai to remain weak. 
Amr Arfan pointed out that there might furthermore be another reason why 
Sinai is a “conflict area”: 
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Sinai is an area full of resources, and resourceful areas are usually the areas of conflicts, so if 
you look at the map of the world and you spot a conflict, you’ll know that it’s a resourceful 
area, […] Sinai is an area close to the Arabic Gulf which is full of petrol, and Sinai itself is rich 
with silicon […], in addition to other minerals like phosphate and so on.302 
 
While most of my interviewees described Sinai as an important area full of different 
types of resources, it was only Arfan that put forward the explanation that this was 
something that naturally attracted conflicts as there is something to fight over, 
mentioning that Israel might have an interest in re-occupying this land.  
4.2 Predominantly Neglected and Scorned Bedouins 
In this chapter we have seen that my sources believe that the perpetrators of most 
attacks that have occurred in Sinai the past decade are predominantly the Bedouins. 
When my informants referred to attacks against the police, military and the frequent 
kidnappings, they described the perpetrators as “the people of Sinai”, namely the 
Bedouins. My sources believed that the main reason why the Bedouins rebel was the 
Mubarak regime’s policy of neglect and discrimination. My interviewees all 
underlined poverty, government violence against own citizens and the lack of 
political rights as important reasons as to why the Bedouins are radicalizing.  
Regarding the bombings of the gas pipe, the cross-border attacks and rockets 
being launched at Israel, attacks targeting the MFO and attacks targeting the 
Christians and the Sufis, my interviewees labelled the perpetrators as “radical 
Islamists”, and in some cases “terrorists”. The “radical Islamists” are described as a 
mix between radicalized Bedouins, local Palestinians, migrants from Gaza (not 
Hamas members), from central Egypt, or coming from other countries (not belonging 
to core al-Qaida). Some of my sources believed these groups are accordingly 
influenced by an al-Qaida ideology. My sources said this ideology was imported to 
Sinai over twenty years ago. The factors that supposedly made the radicalization of 
Sinai possible, and that made some people follow this violent ideology, are the lack 
of “proper education”, leading some to believe in a violent interpretation of Islam, 
and the lack of suitable security presence in the area, making Sinai a “terrorist 
haven”. The natural topography of Sinai is included as a reason for why Sinai is 
today, and always will be, difficult to control. The Camp David agreement with its 
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restrictions on military presence in Sinai is also described as an important reason for 
why the peninsula is out of control. Furthermore, three of my sources also suggest a 
direct involvement by the Mubarak regime or the fulul (supporters of the regime). 
Two sources said they believed the Israeli intelligence might have infiltrated the 
Sinai, pushing the Bedouins to rebel. 
This identification of the perpetrators mostly complies with the descriptions 
presented in the previous chapter, with the exception of the denial of any 
involvement of Hamas or al-Qaida, also the scholarly explanations did not address 
any involvement of Mubarak, his cronies, nor the Israeli intelligence. The FJP’s 
interpretations of why the people of Sinai are radicalizing, mostly complies with the 
explanations found in the previous chapter. However, while the scholars state that the 
continuous repression of “the Bedouin way of life”, their culture and history, might 
be a reason why the Bedouins are rebelling, the FJP members stated they do not view 
the Bedouins as a minority group and only one of my sources actually stated that the 
Bedouins have a distinct culture.  
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5 Freedom and Justice Party’s Policy 
When there is life, the terrorism will disappear.  
- Walid al-Haddad  
 
As shown in the previous chapter, most of my sources in the FJP believe that the 
perpetrators of the attacks in Sinai are predominantly the Sinai Bedouins. Certain 
informants added that some perpetrators could have a Palestinian identity, in that 
they are born in Sinai by Palestinian parents, or coming from Gaza. Others described 
the perpetrators as Egyptians travelling to Sinai from other parts of Egypt, or as 
radical persons arriving from other countries. My interviewees stated that the lack of 
social and economic development, as well as government violence against its citizens 
and lack of political rights are important reasons for why the Bedouins are 
radicalizing. Most of my sources added that a radical Islamist ideology could be the 
motivation behind various attacks, stating that “the lack of proper education” was an 
important reason why some people came to follow this ideology. However, it was the 
lack of suitable security forces in the area that made Sinai into a “terrorist haven”. 
The Camp David Accords, with its restrictions on military presence in Sinai, in 
addition to the natural topography of Sinai, were viewed as the fundamental reasons 
in explanations of why Sinai is difficult to control. Consequently, the FJP needed to 
address three central issues: (1) The social and economical development of Sinai, (2) 
the military and security deficiency in the area, and (3) the government’s relationship 
with the Bedouins. In this chapter I will present my sources’ plan of action, 
representing the FJP’s policy on these three points. 
5.1 Plan of Action  
Hilmi al-Gazzar summarized the FJP’s policy, which all seven sources believed 
would halt and ultimately solve the Sinai issue. He argued that “there must be a 
development plan, and the government started doing that already.”303 Al-Gazzar 
further said that the government also needed to “adjust the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in order to allow the Egyptian government a sufficient security 
presence in Sinai”. 304 And lastly, he underlined that “the government should give the 
people of Sinai their full rights that were taken from them.”305 
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5.1.1 To Kill the Terrorist Problem With Development  
Walid al-Haddad told me that the key to prevent future terrorist attacks was to invest 
in the area, saying: “I think the most important way to kill the terrorist problem is the 
development of the industrial areas. […] They will not survive together.”306  
In FJP’s election program, Sinai is mentioned four times in a document 
consisting of 49 pages (in Arabic).307 According to the program, the party’s priority 
in Sinai is the development of an industry that will provide increased job possibilities 
to all inhabitants. In its program, the FJP states that it aims to focus on development 
by “establishing national projects with geographical dimensions, giving priority to 
projects for the development of Sinai.”308 More specifically, the FJP declares its 
desire to implement the “Sinai reconstruction project”, including the project to plant 
400,000 acres of various crops in the peninsula in addition to constructing a network 
of railway lines for “the reclamation and reconstruction of Sinai.” 309 This is thought 
to serve industrial areas and new mining areas. In accordance with their program, all 
of my sources in the FJP emphasized the need to develop Sinai. Amr Arfan told me 
that firstly, the government needed to do research on Sinai in order to develop the 
peninsula in a suitable way:  
 
The National Authority for the Development of the Sinai Peninsula [SDA], which was formed 
after the elections, is an agency where its employers’ work is being fully dedicated to do 
research and then implement the development of Sinai at all levels – culturally, educationally, 
socially and financially, focusing especially on solving the employment issue.310  
 
He was eager to underline that this agency was established to “improve all of Sinai”, 
not just the South and not just the tourist industry, “like Mubarak had done”.311 Alaʾ 
Sayyid underlined that the FJP was planning a comprehensive development of all of 
Sinai, which would benefit the Bedouins in both the northern and southern parts of 
the peninsula.312 Walid al-Haddad elaborated on the FJP’s more concrete plans for 
the development of Sinai, like the Nahda-program that is focusing on the 
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development of the Suez Canal, and the Wadi Tecnologiyya-project, which is related 
to computer and IT technology.313 Murad Ali added:  
 
When it comes to the economic improvement, we want to develop the agriculture in Sinai 
and start with proper utilisation of the mines in Sinai, giving incentives for investors to move 
to Sinai and to build communities – especially industrial communities.314  
 
Murad Ali told me in depth about a new bridge that the government, supposedly after 
the request of president Mursi, was going to build in Sinai. This bridge would 
connect the peninsula to Saudi Arabia and revive Sinai’s tourist industry.315  
My interviewees often referred to Sinai as a near-empty land, waiting to be 
populated and utilized. Ammar Fayad told me: “We also aim to increase the 
population in Sinai. Now we have about half a million living in Sinai, but we aim to 
raise this number.”316 Likewise, al-Haddad stated that the FJP’s policy was to 
increase the migration flow of Egyptians from mainland Egypt to the peninsula. 
When I said that the Bedouins might consider bigger parts of Sinai as belonging to 
them, al-Haddad replied that the FJP works for “a fair distribution of the wealth of 
the land”, explaining: 
 
We have many resources in Sinai. During Mubarak’s regime, most of these resources were 
distributed to some few people in the regime. Not to the people, for the Egyptians. So we now 
need to start cooperating between the people in Sinai, the government and the foreign 
investors, in order to extract these resources and to utilize these resources for the people in 
Sinai and for other people that will maybe migrate from other regions to Sinai.317 
 
The FJP’s re-population plan may seem logical to the central government, but for the 
free-moving Bedouins this would represent an uncomfortable development, as scarce 
resources, land and jobs would then have to be shared with settlers and developers.  
Many of my sources underlined that a tighter cooperation with Hamas was 
needed in order to improve the economic situation in Sinai. During the time the FJP 
was in government, the relationship with Hamas was drastically improved. In the 
FJP’s program, it is emphasized that the Palestine issue is important for the MB and 
the FJP, and that “Egypt’s national security will only be achieved by carrying out its 
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role in the Arab and Islamic region […]”.318 After the revolution in 2011, Hamas 
offered logistical assistance to the Egyptian troops on the southern side of the border. 
Although it was tentative at first, the coordination expanded significantly after the 
fall of Mubarak. The Mursi government and Hamas ministers met and negotiated a 
future cooperation that was thought to reverse years of economic deterioration in 
Gaza and provide the Bedouins with a formal economy – above ground – in return 
for a closure of the tunnel complex. The Hamas prime minister and Mursi also 
discussed the reopening of the Egyptian consulate, the linkage of Gaza to Egypt’s 
electricity grid and the easing of travel restrictions for Palestinians. Accordingly, my 
sources stressed that a number of tribal chiefs from Sinai were also included in the 
meetings to discuss these issues.319  
While the FJP was in government, close to two billion Egyptian pounds were 
allocated to the development of Sinai in the 2012-2013 fiscal budget.320 After the 
2011 revolution, the authorities established the SDA, whose tasks would include 
construction of a railway and a canal to supply water to central Sinai. They also 
planned to connect Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula with a bridge extending 32 
kilometres across the Red Sea from Sinai to Tabuk in Saudi Arabia, with 
construction of the bridge set to begin in 2013.321 My sources presented this as part 
of the FJP’s policy, and something that the party had accomplished while in 
government. Yet, as was the case with al-Sadat and to an extent also Mubarak, the 
FJP’s policy plans largely failed to materialize on the ground during FJP’s short time 
in power.  
5.1.2 No Investment Will Come When People Are Killed 
My sources accused the Mubarak regime of not deploying sufficient military forces 
in Sinai in order to tackle the radicalization. At the same time, they also accused the 
regime of brutal use of other security forces in tackling the radicalization, including 
the widespread use of torture and mass arrests by the SSI. As we have seen in 
chapter two, the FJP’s program does not explicitly say there should be an increased 
presence of military forces in Sinai, but focuses on the reform of Egypt’s security 
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forces in order to uphold and respect human rights and work in accordance with the 
rule of law.322 Before Mursi had been elected president, he said on a conference in 
North Sinai that he believed the investment in Sinai would lead to national security:  
 
We will not forget Sinai anymore, for the general good of all Egypt. We realize the importance 
of water and minerals of Sinai, and will work on the development of all fields here. This will 
also mean that Egypt’s national security will be safeguarded against any aggression.323 
 
When I asked my sources about their Sinai policy, they told me about the FJP’s 
development plans. However, when I asked why they believe the current situation 
had emerged, they stressed the lack of security. Nussiba Ashraf was one of my 
informants who stated that she believed the increasing radicalization of Sinai is 
mainly due to “a cultural or ideological problem”, underlining that proper education 
is the key to solve the radicalization. She explained: “OK, you cannot prevent 
terrorists from doing anything wrong in your country, you can kill them and arrest 
them and so on, but their ideas are still present.” 324 Murad Ali and Nussiba Ashraf 
both stated that the FJP was going to improve the educational facilities in Sinai. 
Mursi also promised to dedicate 20 billion Egyptian pounds for the implementation 
of the Nahda project, which Sinai has a central role, and for “the Sinai and the 
university, adding more colleges during the coming 5 years.”325  
During the time when FJP was in power, the military launched an operation in 
Sinai that was initially named Operation Eagle, but later renamed into Operation 
Sinai. My sources gave me the impression that they had sanctioned this operation 
and fully supported it, arguing that Sinai is becoming a lawless area. When asked 
directly about the military operation, Nussiba Ashraf replied, “When you have a 
terrorist killing 16 of your soldiers, you cannot just tell him ‘come here, and let us 
talk’”.326 Ammar Fayad further underlined: “You cannot do anything in Sinai before 
the security situation is improved. No investment will come when the police are 
being attacked and people are killed.”327 When I asked Murad Ali about the military 
operation, he stressed that the FJP needed more military in the area, but they needed 
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to use these forces “to protect the locals and not use the military against the people as 
the Mubarak regime did”. He continued by stating: 
 
Violence should be treated and should be managed, but not with extra violence. If you can 
forgive people, and allow them to put down their weapons, with clear terms, and incorporate 
them into the country and the community, this will be very healthy because what we fear is to 
enter into a circle of violence that will never end.328 
 
Later in the interview, Ali also added: “When you are harassing me or abusing my 
human rights, what happens? You will get a circle of revenge.”329  
Operation Sinai is limited in time, but all of my sources underlined the need to 
permanently deploy more soldiers to the peninsula. I asked Ammar Fayad why the 
party was so concerned with the permanent increase of military forces in Sinai, when 
at the same time they asserted that development was the key to solve the 
radicalization in a long-term perspective. He told me that the party and the rest of the 
government viewed the situation as complex, and even though he still believed that 
development was vital, there were additional reasons for having a military presence 
in Sinai: 
 
First of all, this is not only a security problem and not only a development problem. You 
should know that Sinai has a critical geography. Every time anyone wanted to control Egypt, 
they came through Sinai, and therefore you must have a strong military presence in Sinai. Not 
to fight terrorism, not to fight the people in Sinai, but to prevent illegal actions and activities in 
Sinai.330  
 
Fayad therefore believed that the FJP had to deploy increased military forces to the 
peninsula on a permanent – something that is prohibited by the Camp David 
Accords. Prior to and during the parliamentary election in Egypt in 2011/2012, what 
concerned Israeli media, was the FJP’s views on the Camp David Accords.331 Less 
than four months after Mursi had won the election, the FJP’s chairman, Dr. 
Muhammad Saad Katatny, delivered a statement that recommended “reviewing all 
unfair agreements that negatively impact Egypt’s right to protect its interests – 
                                                
328 Ali. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Fayad. 
331 "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Fate of Israel peace treaty may be decided in referendum," Haaretz, 
January 1, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-fate-of-
israel-peace-treaty-may-be-decided-in-referendum-1.404889 (accessed Mai 7, 2013). 
 73 
especially the Camp David Accords – and reconsidering the clauses impeding full 
Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai.”332 References to Israel in the Egyptian public 
discourse after the 2011 revolution were hostile; president Mursi did not speak 
directly with Israel and the gas agreement between the two countries was cancelled 
by Egypt in April 2012 after pressure from the Islamist parties.333 
Some of my sources described Israel’s strategic dilemma as a choice between 
protecting its southern frontier by leaving Sinai in the hands of hostile but less 
technologically advanced non-state actors (Bedouins and others) or a proactive 
intervention while Egypt is weak. A third option, i.e. that Israel could actually 
empower Egypt’s military so close to its own border, was by my sources rejected as 
impossible. Therefore, all of my sources in the FJP seemed to be in agreement that 
“something had to be done” with the Camp David Accords, although they had 
differing views on what needed to be done. Alaʾ Sayyid said, “the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s ideology considers Israel as an enemy and dictates that we should 
fight against it. However, we are also obliged to respect our agreements and treaties,” 
underlining that if Israel was to violate the treaty, Egypt would have the right to 
overturn it.334 Walid al-Haddad added: “It needs to be a comprehensive peace from 
both sides,”335 stating that although the FJP desires peace, they were going to request 
amendments to the accord, especially after the Gaza offensive in 2012. Al-Haddad 
implied that Israel through the assault on Gaza had in fact broken their part of the 
agreement. Some of FJP’s members stressed the importance of re-examining the 
peace treaty with Israel, while others indicated the government should abrogate the 
treaty because Israel has violated it, and others still wanted to allow the Egyptian 
people to vote on it via a referendum or to amend certain components.  
The reason why my sources believed this was important was not just “to fight 
terrorists,” but also to protect civilians, investments and facilities in the area. 
Furthermore, my sources found it deeply unfair that although Sinai is considered 
Egyptian land, the treaty prevents Egypt from having a sufficient army in the area. 
Alaʾ Sayyid chiefly among them - found it deeply unfair and absurd that while Sinai 
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is considered Egyptian land, the treaty prevents Egypt from having its army there.336 
Nussiba Ashraf said: “Sinai is a very critical and important part for the national 
security of Egypt, so our position is simply that the Egyptian state has to extend its 
sovereignty on each part of it.”337  
Nevertheless, the treaty was not put to a referendum or altered in any way 
during the time the FJP was in power. Mursi continuously stressed his intention to 
respect all international agreements, and the Israeli Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, 
confirmed during Mursi’s time as president that the two countries continue to consult 
with each other regarding additional troop placements in the Sinai under the “Agreed 
Activities Mechanism” overseen by the MFO.338 
5.1.3 Make the Bedouins More Loyal to Their Country 
As my sources believed that the lack of development and the use of violence against 
people could lead to terrorism, they all emphasized the need to include the Bedouins 
in their development projects and reform the Egyptian security services. Ashraf 
underlined that they were already providing “the people of Sinai” with more jobs.339 
In April 2012, the North Sinai governor appointed by Mursi issued a decree making 
residence in the Sinai a condition for applying for civil servant jobs, and in both 
North and South Sinai municipal mayors appointed Bedouin deputies.340 In addition 
to the policy shown above, it was clear that the FJP was also seeking to improve the 
relationship to the Bedouins in other ways.  
 
Islam as a Common Platform 
Several of my interviewees in the FJP told me that many Egyptians, and especially 
the media, had characterized the Bedouins as more loyal to their tribes than to the 
Egyptian state, and some had even labelled the Bedouins as traitors for being overly 
friendly towards the Israelis during the occupation of Sinai from 1967-1982. My 
sources then underlined that this was of course not true, and that Bedouins were no 
different from other Egyptians.341 During a conference in Sinai, prior to him being 
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president, Mursi referred to the Bedouins, stating: “History has written that they are 
the most patriotic people, who never betrayed their country – a land where prophets 
have walked; a land mentioned in the Holy Quran.”342 As the FJP is an Islamist 
party, they also underlined the common Islamic values that the party and the people 
of Sinai shared.343 
 
Halt the Discrimination of the Bedouins 
Muhammad Beltagy, FJP Secretary in Cairo, said in an interview that the welfare of 
“the Sinai people” is very important to the party. In an article posted in 2012 on the 
MB web page Ikhwan Web, he stated that the former regime “treated the people of 
Sinai as third class citizens”.344 In the same period as the article was written, Beltagy 
was head of the hearing committee of the Constituent Assembly, tasked with writing 
Egypt’s new Constitution. During this period he visited the Sinai region, met families 
and elders, and listened to their suggestions for the constitution. On his Facebook 
page, Beltagy posted the following statement: 
 
We were shocked to hear of the Sinai people’s suffering and their sense of alienation in their 
own homeland, as they spoke of how they were persecuted and barred from all top civilian 
posts, and also from police, military and judicial colleges and jobs.345 
 
All of my sources in the FJP were very aware of the Mubarak regime’s 
discrimination towards the Bedouins in Sinai. When I asked Amr Arfan to tell me 
about the FJP’s policy towards the Bedouins, he told me that “based on fundamental 
human rights, we want to give them equal rights to any other Egyptian, male or 
female, regardless of their religion and gender.” 346 Hilmi al-Gazzar stated the FJP 
would provide the Bedouins with “their full rights that were taken from them, 
including the right to be officers in the police and the army, which was prohibited 
before.”347 Ashraf and Arfan also explicitly underlined this, with the additional 
specification that Bedouins should also be hired in the intelligence service.348 
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Although not stating it outright, some of my sources gave me the impression that the 
FJP had started to change the trend of barring the Bedouins from security services. 
However, already in September 2011, before the FJP was in government, Egypt’s 
military training college in Cairo began accepting Bedouin recruits from Sinai for the 
first time.349 What is clear, however, is that the FJP wanted to continue this policy. 
Nussiba Ashraf also highlighted the issue of the Bedouins’ right to own land, 
stating: 
 
What we are trying to do now is to enhance the development in Sinai so that the people in 
Sinai become more satisfied and more loyal to their lands. You have heard about the law of the 
land, that they did not have the possibility to own land before, so there are many actions to 
satisfy the people and their loyalty to the land, and to really include Sinai in the development 
of the whole Egyptian state.350 
 
Al-Haddad and Nussiba told me that Mursi had already dealt with this issue, “giving 
the Bedouins their rights”.351 Ammar Fayad said that the FJP had actually started to 
“solve the Bedouin problem in Sinai, and make them feel that Egypt is a country for 
Bedouins and all Egyptians”, referring to the new law.352 The government under 
Mursi issued a new law in September 2012, giving unprecedented ownership rights 
to the local residents of Sinai. However, although the law was supposed to provide 
especially the Bedouins with rights of ownership, it ended up excluding several of 
them. First of all, the law banned land ownership on the eastern border of the 
governorate (with the exception of Rafah).353 This is an area almost exclusively 
populated by the Bedouins. Secondly, decree no. 14 of 2012 states that all Egyptian 
citizens holding a second foreign nationality, or those who are descendants of at least 
one non-Egyptian parent, including of course all non-Egyptian citizens, must sell 
their rights to property (being private or commercial) within 6 months. Many 
Bedouins in Sinai are born by parents with no identity records; some are married to 
non-Egyptian citizens, and others acquired additional citizenships when they fled 
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Sinai during the years of Israeli occupation. All of these factors are therefore now 
preventing them from gaining landownership.354 
 
Dialogue Rather than Violence 
Hilmi al-Gazzar also stressed the need to allow the Bedouins to “express themselves 
in another way than through violence”.355 Therefore he underlined the need to listen 
to all of Egypt’s citizens, including the radicals in Sinai. Instead of just approaching 
the situation with military and police violence, al-Gazzar believes dialogue should be 
attempted.356 In extension, many of my sources emphasized that the right to freedom 
of expression is essential to hinder terror. 
As shown in the previous chapter, my sources believe that the government’s 
use of violence towards the Bedouins had only aggravated the situation. All of my 
sources were clear that the FJP needed to improve relationships with the Bedouins, 
and that this was something the prior regime had made difficult with its excessive 
use of violence and oppression. Ammar Fayad said: “When people are afraid and 
people do not have a minimum level of human rights, they will rebel”.357 Following 
the terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2006, the Mubarak regime started its battle 
against terrorists in the peninsula. The authorities fought the terrorists by an 
exceptionally brutal use of violence. Many Bedouins claimed their relatives were 
convicted in unfair trials, and have demanded that the government revoke the 
sentences. During his time as president, Mursi promised that cases where Sinai 
Bedouins were tried in absentia under the former regime would be reviewed.358 
Nussiba Ashraf also criticized the Mubarak regime for only dealing with Sinai “as a 
security issue”, and that “every relation between the regime and the people in Sinai 
was through the security forces”. She underlined that even though they needed more 
military in the area, the Mubarak regime had used its forces “in a wrong way to deal 
with the issue”.359 In the media, the FJP and the previous president Mursi have been 
accused of being too soft in their approach to Sinai because of their reluctance to 
“employ heavy-handed tactics to stop the increasing flow of arms and militants into 
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the peninsula” and also because of “his [Mursi’s] seeming disinterest in avenging the 
deaths of Egyptian soldiers […]”.360 Ashraf told me that what the FJP would do 
different was to keep an open dialogue, like sending delegations to Sinai to talk with 
the tribe leaders. She added that Mursi had already been to North Sinai three times 
during 2012, which was more times than Mubarak was in North Sinai during his 
thirty years in power.361 While he was president, Mursi also promised to establish a 
committee of Sinai Bedouins to give advice on local issues.362 In 2012 there were 
many abductions in Sinai, and Mursi used local Bedouin leaders to mediate between 
authorities and kidnappers in an effort to free the kidnapped. The general approach of 
dialogue rather than military force was also the reaction after terrorist attacks.363 As a 
response to this, Mursi was accused of being “naive and unfit to rule” in the media 
because of his approach of “mediation with tribal chiefs, rather than the standard 
military response”.364 In March 2013, Mursi met with the North Sinai tribal chiefs to 
discuss the new landownership law. As a result of the meeting, the annual budget for 
development projects in the governorate was raised from 50 million Egyptian pounds 
to 1 billion. After the meeting with Mursi, the delegation met with representatives of 
the SCAF to discuss the possibility of cancelling the 2012 resolution that banned 
landownership on the eastern border of the governorate, as this was considered a 
security matter out of the government’s hands.365  
 
Civil and Political Rights 
My sources also stressed that they wanted to include the Bedouins in decision-
making processes and political institutions. Walid al-Haddad supplemented by 
saying that Mursi “is very keen to have Bedouins, Nubians and others participating 
in political life.”366 Murad Ali said that in order to halt the radicalization of Sinai, the 
government should allow the Bedouins to  
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participate effectively in political decisions, in economic development, and in social activities, 
encouraging them to establish a proper civil community. All [of this is] important to bring 
them back to the country.367 
 
Amr Arfan stated that one of the reasons why the radicalization occurred could be 
the exclusion of the Bedouins from political institutions, stating that the FJP “will let 
the people of Sinai enter the government’s institutions”.368 My informants said that it 
was useless trying to exclude someone from participation in the political institutions 
in Egypt. They referred to their own history, saying the MB had been active since 
1928, and most of the time its members were suppressed and no matter who were in 
government, they had tried to hinder the MB members from participation in politics. 
Still, after eighty years of struggle, the FJP won both a parliamentary and a 
presidential election. One source added: “The Egyptian people will not stop working 
for justice.”369  Many of my sources emphasized the need to improve the democratic 
institutions in Sinai for all its inhabitants. Murad Ali argued that the relationship 
between the government and the Bedouins had to improve because “when people 
feel that their government is not serving them, they could easily rebel against it”.370 
Therefore, both he and Nussiba Ashraf emphasized the need to “make the Bedouins 
more loyal to their land” and that the way to do this was by providing the Bedouins 
with the same rights as other Egyptians.371 Nussiba Ashraf told me that the FJP saw 
the inclusion of the people in political institutions as vital to make “the people feel 
that they are heard.”372 
5.2 Development, Security and Equal Rights to All Egyptians 
In conclusion: The party’s official program, public statements and the majority of my 
sources underlined the development of Sinai as the primary tactic to permanently halt 
the radicalization. The FJP members stated that they wanted to develop Sinai by 
increasing investments in the area and by providing “the people of Sinai” with 
improved education institutions, better health care and increased job opportunities.  
Although not mentioned explicitly in the FJP’s program, all of my sources 
underlined that they also needed to permanently increase the deployment of military 
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and security forces in Sinai. They argued that this was only possible through the 
amendment or termination of the Camp David Accords. They were not just arguing 
that they needed more military forces to tackle “today’s terrorists”, but they also 
emphasized the need to permanently deploy more soldiers to Sinai in order to 
provide the people with security and to prevent aggression from potential foreign 
enemies. Furthermore, my sources found it deeply unfair that Israel, through the 
accord, was determining the quantity of Egypt’s military forces deployed inside 
Egyptian land. The FJP members were also concerned with the improvement of the 
quality of the security and military forces, arguing that the brutal way of using these 
forces in the past had damaged the relationship between the central government and 
the Bedouins. My informants said they were going to include the Bedouins in their 
development project, and that this would show the Bedouins they were no longer 
neglected. They would also focus on dialogue rather then the use of military force, 
and moreover, they underlined the significance of providing the Bedouins with the 
same rights that other Egyptians enjoy, such as rights of landownership and other 
civil and political rights. 
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6 A New Policy Towards Sinai and the Bedouins? 
The terrorist attack that struck Taba in 2004 marked the beginning of a new wave of 
Islamist violence in Egypt, this time with a change of location; namely the Sinai 
Peninsula. The group convicted of the attack consisted mainly of Bedouins and 
Egyptian-born Palestinians. The perpetrators of previous terrorist attacks in Egypt 
were typically men from mainland Egypt, so the Taba attack also marked a change in 
the typical terrorist identity.  
The Egyptian revolution of 2011 took a different form in Sinai than in the rest 
of Egypt. Bedouin groups overpowered government forces and established a form of 
self-rule. Terrorist attacks and crimes increased, along with religious conservatism. 
After Mursi won the presidential election and the new Cabinet was sworn in on 
August 2, 2012, a hot topic in the Egyptian political climate was how the post-
revolution government was going to deal with the Sinai issue. During my fieldwork, 
my sources in the FJP believed that the perpetrators of the attacks in Sinai were 
predominantly Bedouins. They further asserted that the Bedouins’ reason for 
rebelling was primarily the policy of the previous Mubarak regime, stating that the 
FJP would lead a new and improved policy towards Sinai and its people. 
In this chapter I compare the FJP’s policy towards Sinai with that of the 
Mubarak regime by looking at four policy recommendations. The ICG, the Chatham 
House and the Washington Institute highlight various aspects of the situation and 
present slightly different recommendations. Combined they argue that in order to halt 
and permanently solve the radicalization of Sinai, the Egyptian government should: 
(1) Implement a comprehensive development plan for the entire Sinai, (2) increase 
the military and security presence in the peninsula (it was strongly recommended that 
these forces work in accordance with human rights and the rule of law), and (3) 
improve Egypt’s relationships with Sinai’s neighbours Israel and (4) similarly for 
Gaza. Embedded in these recommendations was the importance of a radical 
improvement in the relationship between the Sinai Bedouins and the central Egyptian 
government. Through exploring the FJP’s policy in these four areas, I will answer 
my research question on whether and how the FJP represented a new policy towards 
the Bedouins in Sinai. 
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6.1 A Comprehensive Socio-Economic Development of Sinai 
Although the Mubarak regime made the southern Sinai an attractive tourist 
destination, only a few benefitted from this development. Throughout the past thirty 
years the Mubarak regime systematically favoured the Nile Valley migrants in Sinai, 
while the regime neglected to provide the Bedouins with socio-economic- and 
cultural rights. Most of Sinai lack basic infrastructure and suffers from deficiencies 
in both education and healthcare. Additionally, the Mubarak regime systematically 
promoted the Pharaonic heritage at the expense of Sinai’s Bedouin traditions and 
gave no effort to provide them with any polyethnic rights, nor any self-government 
rights. 
All the three research institutions recommended that the government put 
together a comprehensive social and economic development plan for Sinai, which 
deals with the region as a whole, and takes account of the socio-economic 
interdependence of the north and the south. The two reports state that the government 
should work to eliminate all criteria and procedures discriminate against the local 
population, and also support and promote the Sinai Bedouin traditions and practices 
as a recognized part of Egyptian culture.  
The FJP stated that they regarded Sinai as a neglected area, but that the party’s 
policy was going to change this. The FJP was going to implement a comprehensive 
socio-economic development plan in order to fight poverty, improve the education 
system, the health care and the infrastructure, underlining the importance of 
including the Bedouins in these projects.  
The most obvious explanation for this policy is my sources own clarification 
for why they wanted to undertake it. They underlined poverty, neglect and 
discrimination, as important reasons why people turn to violence. Therefore, they 
assumed that in order to stop the radicalization of Sinai and to gain control of the 
area, the most effective policy would be to stop the on-going discrimination of the 
Bedouins (that they believe are rebelling), and secure their socio-economic rights. 
My informants stated they did not believe that discrimination and the lack of 
development alone could explain the terrorism that has been affecting Sinai 
throughout the previous decade. However, they believed that the FJP’s plan to ensure 
development through an inclusive economic and social policy that takes into account 
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basic needs of the entire population of Sinai, would make the Bedouins feel grateful 
and give them a feeling of belonging to the nation, and thus, promote social peace.  
My sources declared that another reason for focusing on development was 
simply that Sinai is a part of the Egyptian land, and the peninsula is full of resources 
waiting to be utilized. They argued that the development and utilization of the area 
would benefit all of the Egyptian people. The development would not only generate 
wealth, but also solve the problems of overpopulation and unemployment in other 
parts of Egypt. In addition, it would provide a more sustainable development, 
thought focusing on cultivating Egyptian land and reducing the import of certain 
food items, which was an important part of the FJP program.  
The FJP agreed that the Bedouins were increasingly radical because they had 
been discriminated against. However, the FJP’s understanding of this builds on the 
underlying assumption that the Bedouins desired to become fully integrated members 
of the Egyptian state, to obtain equal rights and be treated in the same way as other 
Egyptian citizens. Ashraf’s statement: “they want to be like us, they want to be 
Egyptians,” is only one of several statements that express this attitude. The statement 
also indicates that my sources perceive the Bedouins as not yet fully Egyptian. Still, 
in general they refused to label the Bedouins as a “minority” and more often that not, 
used the phrase “the people of Sinai” rather than the Arabic word for “Bedouin”, 
when clearly talking about the Bedouins. As they did not recognize the group as a 
minority, the party was not planning to support and promote the Sinai Bedouin 
traditions and practices as a recognized part of Egyptian culture, or provide them 
with any financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with 
the group’s culture. This means that although the FJP was going to provide the 
Bedouins with socioeconomic rights, they were not planning on providing them with 
any polyethnic rights.  
The importance of not referring to Bedouins as a minority group could be 
explained in several ways. Firstly, the reluctance to use the word minority could 
steam from the perception of “minority” as “the other” or someone who is “not 
equal”. Thus, the use of the word would undermine the unity of the nation. Looking 
at the FJP’s program and their public statements, it becomes clear that the party is 
largely concerned with achieving national unity and fighting sectarianism. An 
example here is Mursi’s statement: “Christians in Egypt are partners in this 
homeland, not a minority. They have the full right in their state, because they are an 
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important component of this nation.”373 Does this mean that if the Christians are a 
minority then they are consequently not “partners”, and have fewer rights than the 
majority? If this was the FJP’s understanding of what it means to be a minority in 
Egypt, then stating that the Bedouins are not a minority seems to fit with their 
inclusive policy towards the group.  
Another aspect of the focus on “unity” and the reluctance to label anyone a 
“minority” is the prevailing notion during the 2011 revolution was that all Egyptians 
are equal and that they should stand together. Many of my sources underlined this 
notion when they said that “we are all Egyptians” or “we are all one hand”, which 
are slogans from the revolution. My informants told me that they wanted to make the 
Bedouins feel like they are a part of the Egyptian society and that they are treated as 
equals to other Egyptians. It is likely that the FJP sought to adopt a policy that 
concurred with slogans and ideas prevailing during the 2011 revolution, as this 
would in it self provide legitimacy.  
Secondly, Mubarak was accused of pursuing a divide and conquer-policy in 
entire Egypt. My sources said that the Mubarak regime had deliberately led a 
campaign to portray the Bedouins as smugglers, drug-dealers and terrorists, in order 
to justify the suppression of the group. Although my informants said that some 
Bedouins were conducting illegal activities, they regarded that as natural considering 
the neglect and discrimination by the Mubarak regime. Members of the MB were 
under the Mubarak regime often labelled as “terrorists”, although they themselves 
argued they were fighting for “freedom and justice”. In this regard, it is also 
important to note that my sources usually referred to the perpetrators of various 
attacks in Sinai using the term “radical Islamists”, rather than “terrorists”. It is first of 
all, likely that the FJP needed to distance itself from Mubarak and was reluctant to 
blame a certain group, as this would be considered to be a divide and conquer 
strategy, and perhaps also because they know all to well that “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter”.  
On the other side, to acknowledge that the Bedouins are a minority could mean 
that the group is actually entitled to certain minority rights. Kymlicka underlines that 
a common conflict between a nation state and a minority nation, is that the minority 
could demand rights to both use and, to a degree, govern certain territories that the 
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minority view as their land, while the government might perceive the same area as 
belonging to the nation state. As we have seen, the Bedouins have demanded transit 
fees and compensation for the use of tribal lands. To acknowledge the Bedouins 
historical territorial claims to the Sinai land would put a halt to the FJP’s grand plans 
of utilizing and developing the peninsula. Besides, the Bedouins constitute today the 
majority of the population in the area, but could have become a minority in a short 
period of time, if the FJP implemented their policy. This would again have allowed 
the central government to control the area without fear of secession. Bringing 
“Egyptian settlers” to the peninsula could be viewed as a political way of gaining 
territorial control and cultural dominance in Sinai. 
But then again, although not referring to the group as a minority, during he 
served as president, Mursi actually vowed to establish a committee of Sinai Bedouins 
to give advice on local issues. According to Kymlicka, a liberal government should 
recognize self-government rights of minority nations that are intended to enable a 
nation to govern itself and maintain its own culture. Relations between the 
government and the minority group should be determined by the use of dialogue. The 
FJP also underlined the importance of dialogue with Bedouin recognized tribal chiefs 
on policy changes or negotiations on other issues that regarded “the people of Sinai”. 
Furthermore, during the time the FJP was in the government, the authorities did not 
interfere with the Bedouin tribal courts, the Bedouins own economic committees or 
their security committees playing the police role in the peninsula. The FJP’s practice 
here may indicate a limited degree of de facto Bedouin self-government rights. 
However, I could not trace any public acknowledgement or recognition of for 
example the Bedouin courts or rulings, during the time Mursi and the FJP were in the 
government. This suggests that the FJP was probably not planning to legalize or 
formalize any self-government rights for the Bedouins.   
The FJP perceived the situation as being a result of neglect and discrimination, 
which concurs with the explanation presented by the research institutes. The FJP 
wanted to implement a comprehensive socio-economic development plan for the 
entire Sinai, which would provide the Bedouin population with: (1) Enhanced 
infrastructure, (2) improved educational institutions, (3) better health care and (4) 
create a viable industry in various fields that would improve employment 
opportunities. The FJP also planned to (5) populate Sinai by encouraging and 
facilitating migration from mainland Egypt. On these five points, the FJP follows the 
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policy recommendation of promoting the Bedouins socio-economic rights. However, 
the party did not seek to develop any policy that would support and promote the 
Sinai Bedouins’ traditions and culture as a recognized part of the Egyptian culture, 
although this was recommended by the ICG report. The first four points of the FJP’s 
policy is radically different from the Mubarak regime’s policy. While the Mubarak 
regime excluded the Bedouins from the development, the FJP said it wanted to 
include and “incorporate” them. Regarding the last point, both the FJP and the 
Mubarak regime shared a centralist nationalistic vision for Sinai, which generally 
ignored the special characteristics of the Bedouin way of life. The party’s refusal to 
recognize the Bedouins as a minority meant that, similarly to the Mubarak regime’s 
policy, also the FJP neglected to provide this group with any cultural or polyethnic 
rights. Yet, the FJP’s practice of dealing and negotiating with recognized leaders 
amongst the Bedouins, signals an important step towards limited de facto self-
government rights for the Bedouins. 
6.2 Increased Deployment of Military and Security Forces 
The Mubarak regime never violated the Camp David Accords’ regulations for 
military deployment in Sinai. Still, its reaction towards the radicalization of Sinai has 
essentially been confined to the security sphere: tracking down and eliminating the 
terrorists. Misusing the emergency law for almost a decade, the regime violated 
human rights, especially civil and political rights, by using the police and army to 
suppress the local population. The regime did little or nothing to encourage 
participation of Sinai indigenous peoples in the political life and used divide-and-
conquer tactics in orchestrating the meagre local representation allowed.  
The Washington Institute article argues that Egyptian soldiers should be 
temporarily deployed along the boarder with Israel and Gaza, and that Egypt should 
be allowed to increase its overall military presence in Sinai. The ICG and the 
Chatham House reports argues that in addition to the presence of a strong military, 
good intelligence is of great importance, which in turn depends on a fundamentally 
cooperative attitude of the majority of the local population. In order to enhance 
relationship between the Bedouins and the Egyptian authority, the government must 
respect and protect the Bedouins human rights. 
The FJP’s military plan for Sinai, included the launching of a temporary 
military operation, but they also stressed the need to permanently deploy increased 
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military and security forces in the peninsula. However, when searching for the FJP’s 
security strategy for Sinai, both my sources and the FJP’s program underlined the 
importance that the security forces operate in accordance with the constitution, the 
principles of the rule of law, and human rights. My sources further stated that they 
were planning to hire the Bedouins in the military and security services and to 
include the Bedouins in decision-making processes and political institutions. 
My sources explained why they needed the temporary military operation in the 
following way. First of all, it was necessary in order to protect Sinai’s civilians from 
attacks, as the development of Sinai would take time, while the government was 
responsible for providing security for the entire Egyptian population. Further, my 
informants said that the temporary military operation was launched in order to arrest 
people who were conducting violent actions against civilians, military and 
policemen, and to protect the infrastructure. I will argue that most nation states 
would probably do the same in a similar situation. 
In order to explain why the FJP underlined the need to permanently increase 
the presence of the military forces in Sinai, my informants argued that considering 
the Sinai’s topography and strategic importance, the number currently allowed by the 
Camp David Accords is too low, also in a peaceful Sinai. Besides, many viewed the 
permanent increase in military deployment as a matter of principle. As we have seen 
in the FJP program and various statements, the party is rather concerned with the 
strengthening of Egypt’s position in the Arab world. They argued that Sinai is 
Egyptian land and found it deeply unfair that Israel determined the size of the 
military forces the Egyptian nation could deploy. Some also stated that to fully 
control Sinai would give a political advantage, for instance when discussing or re-
negotiating the terms of the Camp David Accords. Furthermore, my sources believed 
that the utilization of Sinai’s resources was not possible without proper security 
arrangements. Therefore, I will argue that although the FJP wanted to deploy 
increased security forces in Sinai “to combat terrorists” and start to develop and 
utilize Sinai, the underlying importance of the increased deployment of military 
forces, was actually more an issue of a nation’s sovereign rights to their own land.  
One way of explaining the FJP’s focus on civil and political rights when 
addressing the issue of increased deployment of military forces could be interpreted 
as a political discourse, trying to create a positive image of the party, knowing this 
would generate positive reactions. However, the importance of respecting human 
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rights was underlined both by local politicians (who did not generally seem to weigh 
their words, being rather hostile in their rhetoric when talking about Israel), as well 
as by more prominent politicians (who seemed to have received considerable media 
training and had a very diplomatic, or politically correct, way of speaking). 
Moreover, during his time as president, Mursi was criticized for being too reluctant 
to use “heavy-handed military means” in Sinai and for relying “too much on 
dialogue”.374 My informants said that violence could sometimes be interpreted as a 
political language. They told me that excluding someone from taking part in 
democratic institutions might pressure them to use violence in order to be heard. My 
interviewees referred to their own history, saying that even though previous regimes 
had labelled them as “terrorists”, discriminated against them and tried to hinder the 
MB from participating in the political sphere, they never gave up. And after eighty 
years of struggle, the FJP won both the parliamentary and the president elections. For 
my informants this was a “proof”375 that providing Bedouins with civil and political 
rights was the best way to put an end to the violence. There are many similarities in 
how members of the MB and Bedouins were (mis-) treated during the Mubarak 
regime. I got the impression that my sources in the FJP related to the Bedouins’ 
situation and showed a genuine concern for their human rights. My sources argued 
that the FJP’s focus on forgiveness, development and dialogue, was in the long-term 
perspective more effective than the use of military force. If they truly believed this, 
then their focus on dialogue and the importance of the security services respecting 
human rights makes sense.  
In addition to the factors mentioned in section 6.1, my sources perceived the 
current situation in Sinai as a result of a security deficiency and of the security 
forces’ violations of human rights. This explanation concurs with the explanation 
presented by the research institutes. The party wanted to: (1) Permanently deploy 
increased military and security forces in Sinai, (2) hire Bedouins in military and 
security services, and (3) work to include Bedouins in political institutions and 
decision-making processes. In addition, (4) the FJP underlined the importance of the 
security services working in accordance with the rule of law and human rights. The 
party’s policy largely corresponds with the policy recommendations, with the 
exception of the Washington Institute recommending that the increased military 
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force close to the boarder should only be temporarily. The FJP’s policy underlines 
the importance of guaranteeing Bedouins’ civil- and political rights and the focuses 
on dialogue rather than using security forces in tackling the radicalization. This is 
essentially different from the Mubarak regime’s policy. 
6.3 A Strained Relationship with Israel 
The Mubarak regime’s relations with Israel were stable. After Hamas won the 2007 
elections in Gaza, the Mubarak regime joined Israel in imposing a hermetic seal on 
Gaza and erecting a wall, forcing the people of Gaza and the Bedouins to continue 
their trade underground. All radical Islamist groups that emerged in Sinai during 
Mubarak’s rule and until the present day have an anti-Israel rhetoric. Although the 
militants are said to be a minority, also Bedouin leaders have requested the Egyptian 
parliament to amend the Camp David Accords with Israel.  
The Chatham House report and the Washington Institute article argues that 
tighter security cooperation with Israel would benefit Egypt as a whole. The 
Chatham House report also suggests the formalization of access and movement as 
well as of the trade relationship. The ICG report do not explicitly recommend that 
the government improve its relationship with Israel, but states that a comprehensive 
and lasting resolution of the Sinai question can only be achieved in the context of a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
References to Israel in the Egyptian public discourse under the FJP’s period in 
government were hostile, for example, Mursi did not utter Israel’s name. All of my 
sources underlined that the FJP’s relationship with Israel was strained. Some even 
stated that they regarded Israel as their enemy. A few of my sources blamed Israeli 
intelligence for facilitating attacks and/or infiltrating the Bedouins in Sinai. A 
strategic military cooperation and/or trade cooperation was out of question, 
according to my informants. The FJP wanted to amend the Camp David Accords, 
some even argued in favour of their termination. However, Mursi continuously 
stressed that Egypt will respect the international treaties it has signed and Israel 
permitted increased deployment of military in Sinai though “the Agreed Activities 
Mechanism”, without altering the agreement. Furthermore, Mursi actually functioned 
as a mediator between Gaza and Israel following the 2012 attack on Gaza. All in all, 
during the time the FJP was in the government, there was no radical transformation 
in Egypt’s relations with Israel.  
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The FJP’s ambivalence could be explained in different ways. An explanation 
for a more hostile rhetoric towards Israel could be that the FJP would gain popular 
support among the Bedouins in Egypt by adopting a negative tone towards Israel. I 
will argue that the FJP may very well be aware that the Bedouins have a close 
cultural and ideological connection to Gaza, and that the Mubarak government’s 
cooperation with Israel challenged the legitimacy of his regime. Furthermore, as the 
FJP is an Islamic party with roots in MB, which supports the Palestinian cause, close 
ties with Israel would damage their legitimacy. The Bedouins do not share the 
Pharaonic legacy and have developed a strong resentment towards the central 
Egyptian government. As shown previously, the FJP has several times referred to 
Sinai as “a land where the prophets have walked” and underlined Islamic values as 
common values for the party and the people of Sinai. It seemed like the FJP 
perceived the Bedouin identity as more dependent on religion than belonging to a 
nation state. Therefore, the FJP might want to distance itself from Israel and 
underline their Islamic values in order to establish trust and a better relationship with 
the Bedouins in Sinai.   
The fact that some of my sources blamed Israeli intelligence and the Mubarak 
regime for facilitating attacks and/or infiltrating the Bedouins, is interesting because 
it discharges the Bedouins of some responsibility. The Sharm al-Shaykh bombing 
was distinctive in size and in number of fatalities, killing over eighty people. Saying 
the perpetrators had received assistance by Israeli intelligence and/or the Mubarak 
regime in order to execute this attack, makes “the Bedouin threat” in some way less 
dangerous. Firstly because the Mubarak regime was overthrown, this would mean 
that the Bedouins are not able to execute a similar attack. Secondly, because the FJP 
said they would not cooperate with Israel and that this, accordingly, would make it 
more difficult for the Israeli intelligence to infiltrate the Bedouins across the border. 
Furthermore, the resentment towards Israel and the Mubarak regime is something 
that many Egyptians can agree on, and therefore they make perfect scapegoats. 
Blaming Israel or the Mubarak regime instead of the Bedouins, also underline the 
FJP’s policy that stressed national unity, as mentioned previously in this chapter.  
On the other hand, there was no radical transformation in Egypt’s relations 
with Israel. It could be that the FJP acknowledged that there were some advantages 
in keeping peace with Israel. Perhaps the party realised that a stable and good 
relationship with Israel would provide better communication and security 
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coordination between the two countries, something that would also mean a more 
secure situation for most Bedouins living in Sinai. Besides, the Egyptian government 
received about $1.5 billion a year in aid from the U.S., and it seemed that the FJP 
was keen not to jeopardize the access to this funding. An example could be that 
president Mursi, who had previously refused to talk to Israelis, or even pronounce 
the country’s name, actually worked as a mediator between Gaza and Israel during 
the Gaza crisis, where he then had to negotiate with Israel. This suggests that there 
was an opportunity for the FJP to be a moderating force in the approach towards 
Sinai’s neighbours, including Israel. The FJP was probably also aware of the fact that 
Israel is militarily superior to Egypt, and Egypt’s security interests along the Sinai 
border and inside Sinai provide Egypt with motivation to continue security 
cooperation with Israel.  
As shown above, while the FJP believed that Israel was benefiting from a weak 
Sinai, the scholars describe Israel as suffering from the current situation. During the 
time the FJP was in the government, president Mursi declared he would not talk with 
Israel. Thereby he signalled that: (1) The security cooperation would not be 
enhanced while the FJP was in the government, (2) the party underlined that the 
Camp David Accords had to be revoked or amended, and (3) the FJP was not 
planning to normalize any access of movement or trade. As the FJP perceived the 
situation differently from the scholars, the fact that they were not planning to follow 
the recommendation to improve its relations with Israel, is expected. Nevertheless, 
the relationship with Israel did not radically change while Mursi was president and 
the FJP was in the government. The FJP’s rhetoric towards Israel changed, but the 
actual policy largely remained unchanged under the Mubarak regime. Regardless of 
the actual policy, leading a hostile rhetoric towards Israel and focusing on common 
Islamic values rather than classical Egyptian nationalism when dealing with the 
Bedouins, probably would have improved the relationship between the Bedouins and 
the central Egyptian government. The vitality of the improvement of this relationship 
was embedded in most of the research institutes’ recommendations.  
6.4 A Tighter Cooperation with Gaza 
The Mubarak regime considered Hamas a hostile and threatening entity that 
cooperated with the MB. Throughout Mubarak’s last years, Egyptian officials 
publicly repeated their concerns that Hamas was fostering militancy in Sinai. On the 
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other hand, the negative attitude towards Hamas actually benefited the Sinai 
Bedouins economically as smuggling rose to new heights. 
The Chatham House report argues that the Egyptian government should 
consider a formalization of access and movement, as well as trade relationship with 
Gaza, across the Sinai borders. To fill the security vacuum, the Egyptian government 
should also enhance security coordination between Egypt and the government in the 
Gaza Strip. The ICG report do not explicitly recommend that the government 
improve its relationship with Gaza, but as mentioned above, argues that a lasting 
resolution of the Sinai question can only be achieved in the context of a resolution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
During the time the FJP was in the government, Egypt’s relationship with 
Hamas was significantly improved. Both the FJP’s program and my sources 
emphasized the importance of supporting the Palestinian case, and all denied 
involvement of Hamas in the terrorist actions in Sinai. During the FJP’s time in the 
government, the security cooperation with Hamas expanded considerably. The Mursi 
government and Hamas ministers had conducted negotiations over possible trade 
cooperation. Tribal chiefs from Sinai were also included in discussions related to 
these issues. However, the party did not realize most of these plans during its short 
period of time in government. 
The fact that the FJP would deny the involvement of Hamas in terrorist actions 
in Sinai is only expected considering the FJP’s relationship with the MB. As Hamas 
is a fraction of the Brotherhood they share a similar ideology. My informants explain 
their reason for not blaming Hamas in another way. They argued that the people of 
Gaza had democratically elected Hamas and the group needed to win their trust, 
meaning that Hamas had to show its people that it is able to provide them with jobs 
and food. This is dependent on the Rafah border and the tunnels remaining open, and 
so it would be irrational for Hamas to participate in any terrorist activities, because 
this would close the border and the tunnels. Although I find this explanation highly 
plausible, I am not convinced that Hamas is actually in full control of all its 
members. I believe that another reason why it was so important for the FJP to deny 
any involvement of Hamas in terrorism was that if the Egyptian people perceived 
Hamas as a terrorist organisation, this would affect how the FJP was viewed. 
Therefore, I believe that the rejection of Hamas’ involvement might also be an 
important political move for the FJP not to be seen as “criminals by association”.  
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There is also another reason why the FJP might want to deny the presence of 
Hamas, and similarly deny the presence of al-Qaida, in Sinai. Sinai has a large tourist 
industry, and the FJP would benefit from the return of the tourists who basically 
disappeared after the 2011 revolution. The acknowledgement of the presence of the 
notorious al-Qaida or Hamas in Sinai might damage the industry further. Therefore, 
my sources could have deliberately underestimated the threat. On the other hand, 
they did acknowledge that there might be “radical Islamists” coming from Gaza, 
from other parts of Egypt or from other countries, and that these people may be 
inspired by the al-Qaida ideology. 
Furthermore, it is not unlikely that the FJP considers the situations in Gaza and 
Sinai as ultimately linked, and stabilization of one, would lead to stabilization of the 
other. Therefore, a motivation for a good relationship with Hamas could be that the 
increased communication and security coordination between the two could prevent 
future attacks. Also trade relations were likely to improve the economic situation. 
Especially for the Bedouins living in the north, a free-trade zone would provide the 
Bedouins with a legitimate source of income. As the FJP believes poverty is an 
important reason why people turn to violence, improving the economic situation for 
the people they believe are rebelling would be an expected action. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, most Bedouins, especially those living in the north, have a close 
relationship with Palestine, culturally, economically and ideologically. A 
government that supports Hamas, would by this group, therefore be considered more 
legitimate.  
As seen above, the FJP, the Washington Institute article and the Chatham 
House report perceive the situation differently when it comes to Hamas’s role in the 
radicalization of Sinai. My sources in the FJP denied that Hamas was, but 
acknowledged that there might be Palestinians coming from Gaza and contributing to 
the radicalization. My sources also agreed that the tunnel smuggling poses a problem 
for stability in Sinai. The FJP planned to: (1) established security cooperation with 
Hamas. Furthermore, the Hamas prime minister and Mursi talked about: (2) Opening 
a free trade zone in return for the closure of the tunnels, (3) the reopening of the 
Egyptian consulate, (4) the linkage of Gaza to Egypt’s electricity grid, and (5) easing 
of travel restrictions for Palestinians. This means that regardless of whether or not 
Hamas was involvement in the radicalization, the FJP was planning to follow the 
Chatham House recommendation and improve its relations with Hamas. Based on 
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the Bedouins’ close ties to Hamas, the FJP’s aim to improve their overall relations 
with Hamas probably also improved their relations with the Bedouins. In this regard, 
the FJP’s policy was fundamentally different from that of the Mubarak regime. 
6.5 Conclusion: Old Puzzle with New Pieces  
Much research has been devoted to analysing the MB’s ideology while they stayed in 
the opposition, and many have speculated on what kind of policy the MB would lead 
if they were in power. In this thesis I have addressed how the FJP, an MB-based 
party in the government, was planning to address the issue of the increasingly 
radicalized Sinai in a post-revolution state. The aim of this thesis has been to 
investigate whether and how the FJP represented a new policy in a post-revolution 
nation, through focusing on one area of interest, namely Sinai and its indigenous 
population, the Bedouins.  
To answer this question I compared the FJP’s policy with that of the Mubarak 
regime, through looking at four policy recommendations on approaching the 
radicalization of Sinai. These four recommendations all agree that the central 
government should improve its relationship with the Bedouins and recognize their 
human rights. Kymlicka argues that the general respect for human rights is not 
sufficient when addressing certain minority groups. He argues that ethnic minority 
groups and minority nations could demand polyethnic rights and that a minority 
nation could furthermore demand self-government rights. I wanted to see how the 
FJP planned to approach the Bedouins and what types of rights the party was 
planning to provide the group with. 
By means of interviewing several members of the FJP and studying the party’s 
program and public statements, I discovered that the FJP’s perception of the current 
situation in Sinai largely concurs with picture presented in the ICG and Chatham 
House reports and the Washington Institute article. They all agree that the situation is 
a result of underdevelopment of the bigger part of the peninsula, discrimination and 
suppression of the Bedouins, in addition to decades of security neglect of Sinai that 
have made it a lawless space attractive for terrorists groups. My interviewees agree 
that the perpetrators of the various attacks are predominantly Bedouins, but that also 
Palestinians and non-Sinai residents might be involved. While the research institutes 
also say that Hamas and al-Qaida might be involved, the FJP rejects this. 
Furthermore, some of my sources in the FJP suggested the involvement of the 
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Mubarak regime and Israeli intelligence, something that the research did not 
mention. While my interviewees believed that Israel was benefiting from a weak 
Sinai, the scholars describe Israel as suffering from the current situation. I discovered 
that the FJP was planning on following nearly all of the four recommendations, with 
the exception of an improved relationship with Israel.  
The way the FJP was planning to implement the policy recommendations 
showed that the party was aiming at a significant improvement in the government’s 
relationship with the Bedouins. The FJP stated they would end the discrimination 
and suppression of the Bedouins and provide them with jobs, landownership, 
improved healthcare, infrastructure and education. Although the FJP also wanted to 
increase the deployment of military and security forces in Sinai, the party underlined 
the importance for these forces to respect the rule of law and international human 
rights conventions. Moreover, the FJP would also start to conscript the Bedouins to 
the army, hire them in other security services and include them in political 
institutions. The FJP’s policy of improving their relations with Hamas and having a 
hostile tone towards Israel could, considering the Bedouins’ close ties to Hamas and 
their grievances towards Israel, improve the overall relations between the Bedouins 
and the central government. Additionally, the focus on Islam rather than Egyptian 
nationalism when dealing with the Bedouins could represent an effort in building a 
common platform, and improving the relationship further.  
The general approach towards the Bedouins under the Mubarak regime was to 
treat the minority as alien residents, subject to physical segregation, economical 
discrimination and, in some cases, deprivation of political rights. While the Mubarak 
regime’s approach to the Bedouins was in many ways exclusive, I would describe the 
FJP’s approach as inclusive. The FJP’s general policy of providing the Bedouins 
with cultural, political and socioeconomic rights is radically different from that of the 
Mubarak regime and, hence, it is new.  
However, looking closer at how the FJP was going to implement the above-
mentioned policy changes, I discovered not everything was changed. Both the 
Mubarak regime and the FJP regard Sinai as the Egyptian government’s property and 
an almost empty land, just waiting to be populated. Neither the FJP, nor the Mubarak 
regime had any policy in order to support and promote the Sinai Bedouin traditions 
and culture as a recognized part of Egyptian culture. The Mubarak regime sought to 
“Egyptianize” Sinai and the Bedouins, and the regime suppressed the Bedouin 
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tradition and culture in favour of the Pharaonic-Egyptian culture. The vast majority 
of my informants argued that the Bedouins wanted to be treated as “real” Egyptians, 
stating that they did not regard them as a “minority”. None of my sources argued that 
Bedouin culture and history should be taught in schools, or that the government 
should endorse projects that sought to promote this heritage. With regard to these 
issues, the FJP’s policy and the Mubarak regime’s policy shared a centralist, 
nationalistic vision for Sinai and its people.  
My sources seem to believe that the respect for human rights was enough to 
protect and satisfy the Bedouins. The FJP was not planning to provide the Bedouins 
with any financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with 
the Bedouin culture. In other words, the party was not planning to provide the 
minority with any polyethnic rights. This is not unexpected, as the FJP stated that 
they did not consider the group as a minority. When it comes to granting self-
government rights to the Bedouins, I pictured that this would be impossible because 
my informants all agreed that the Bedouins were no minority. However, the FJP 
dealt with the Bedouin tribal leaders and representatives, and by that, in practice 
recognized them as such. Furthermore, during the time the FJP was in the 
government, the authorities did not interfere with the Bedouin tribal courts, their 
economic committees or the Bedouins’ own security committees playing the police 
role in the peninsula. Additionally, Mursi vowed to establish a committee of Sinai 
Bedouins to give advice on local issues and focused on dialogue with Bedouin 
recognized tribal chiefs, regarding policy changes or negotiations on other issues. All 
of this may indicate that Bedouins would de facto get limited self-government right 
after all. I will still underline, that there were no signs that the party was planning to 
legalize and formalize self-government of the Bedouins.  
To get a broader insight on this topic, some other areas should be studied. First 
of all, the way my sources used the term “minority”, and their eagerness to deny that 
the Bedouins represent a minority, made me think that my sources in the FJP, and 
perhaps Egyptians in general, have a different understanding of this word than we do 
in Western cultures. During my fieldwork, I got the impression that my informants’ 
reluctant use of the word “minority” was derived from the perception of “a minority” 
as a group that is “not equal” and, thus, does not deserve equal rights as the majority. 
However, it could also mean the opposite: That if a government acknowledge a 
group as a minority, then this could mean that group is entitled to, or deserves to 
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achieve special rights, as a group. If these rights go against the government’s own 
interests, then this would of course be a conflict. Indeed, it would be interesting to 
see another research project that could conduct a discourse analysis of the word 
“minority” in the Egyptian context. 
Secondly, a question that needs to be addressed is how much power the FJP 
really had while being in the government. As we have seen, many of my sources’ 
plans for Sinai failed to materialize. This could certainly be explained by the FJP’s 
short period in the government, or that they prioritised other issues. Still, Sinai is a 
vital security area for Egypt, and it seemed like the military was controlling at least 
parts of it. For example, Bedouin leaders were negotiating landownership rights in 
the border area with members of the SCAF, and not with president Mursi or 
members of his Cabinet. The FJP was the party that held most ministers in the Qandil 
Cabinet, but at its most the party occupied twelve out of 35 minister positions. Two 
other ministerial posts belonged to other Islamist parties, while the remaining 
ministers had no party affiliations and were described as independent. However, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance (until January 2013) and the 
Minister of Interior all served under the military appointed Ganzuri-Cabinet the 
preceded the Qandil government. And although Mursi appointed a new Minister of 
Defence, al-Sisi led the coup that overthrew Mursi. These are the most vital and 
influential minister posts in Egypt. The four above-mentioned minister are frequently 
described by the media, as supportive of the military rather than of the FJP. I 
underline that I have not done any research on this subject, but it could perhaps 
explain the lack of implementation of several policy plans in Sinai under president 
Mursi. 
Thirdly, I want to conduct a new round of fieldwork in Sinai in order to learn 
more about the Bedouins’ views on the FJP and the MB. It would be interesting to 
find out how large the radical militant groups are in comparison to Bedouins tribes 
living in peace. Scholarly reports, and more often, the media, have talked about “the 
Bedouins’ various demands”, although the Bedouins are not a single unified group. It 
would also be interesting to do research how strong more separatist tendencies are 
among the Bedouins, in opposition to those Bedouins that clearly wants to be 
provided with equal citizen rights as other Egyptians and actively participate in the 
Egyptian society.  
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In conclusion: The Mubarak regime discriminated the Bedouins and violated 
their human rights: social, economical, cultural, civil and political. The ICG, the 
Chatham House and the Washington Institute have provided the Egyptian 
government with several policy recommendations on how to permanently solve the 
radicalization of Sinai. Although the two reports and the article do not use the term 
human rights, in sum, they clearly imply that these rights should be protected and 
promoted in order to achieve an enduring solution. Kymlicka argues that some 
minority groups should, in addition to basic human rights, be given polyethnic rights, 
and he adds that some groups should get a limited right to self-government.  
I discovered that my sources in the FJP did not portray the Bedouins as a 
minority, and were therefore not planning to give the Bedouins any polyethnic rights. 
On the other hand, my informants underlined the importance of protecting civil and 
political rights of all individuals, in addition to implementing a comprehensive socio-
economic plan benefitting Sinai’s entire people. Regardless of my sources’ view on 
the Bedouins, the party’s practice of dealing with Bedouin representatives, and not 
interfering with various tribal institutions could indicate a pragmatic view on the 
Bedouin’s limited self-government rights. The conclusion of this thesis show that the 
FJP’s policy plans to a large extent follow the most repeated policy 
recommendations, and thus, the party’s policy towards Sinai and the Bedouins 
represent a rather different approach from that of the Mubarak regime. 
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Appendix  
Figure 1. Map of the Sinai Peninsula 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Geographic Guide, available at: http://www.geographicguide.com/africa-
maps/sinai.htm  
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Figure 2. Bedouin Tribal Configuration 
 Source: Discover Sinai, available at: http://discoversinai.net/english/tourist-
information/sinai-maps/  
